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“Someone on the ‘Suspected’ list could very possibly NOT 
be engaged in activities that are counter to our national 
security interests.”1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The government has consistently used the detention and alleged 
recidivism of Guantánamo Bay (GTMO) detainees for political 
purposes since the opening of the detention facility in 2002.  Donald 
Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense at the time, framed the government’s 
narrative of GTMO as a holding place for the world’s “worst of the 
worst.”2  Despite Secretary Rumsfeld’s simultaneous 
acknowledgement that GTMO was filled with low-level detainees who 
had little intelligence value,3 the government has continued to use 
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 1  Email from Todd Breasseale, Pub. Affairs Officer, Office of the Assistant Sec’y 
of Def., to Jason Leopold (Mar. 5, 2012, 4:47 PM) (on file with author). 
 2  Richard Cheney, Vice President of the U.S., Remarks at the Gerald Ford 
Journalism Awards (June, 1, 2009), available at http://press.org/news-
multimedia/videos/cspan/286727-1 (Cheney calls detainees the “worst of the worst” 
at 41:17–41:19).  See, e.g., MARK DENBEAUX, RUMSFELD KNEW: DOD’S “WORST OF THE 
WORST” AND RECIDIVISM CLAIMS REFUTED BY RECENTLY DECLASSIFIED MEMO (2011), 
available at http://law.shu.edu/ProgramsCenters/PublicIntGovServ/policyresearch 
/upload/guantanamo-report-Rumsfeld-Knew.pdf; Mark Denbeaux et al., The 
Guantánamo Detainees During Detention: Data from Department of Defense Records, 41 
SETON HALL L. REV. 1269 (2011). 
 3  Memorandum from Donald Rumsfeld, U.S. Sec’y of Def., to Chairman, Joint 
Chiefs of Staff and Commander, U.S. Central Command (Apr. 21, 2003) 
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GTMO as a political talking point to garner public support for the 
War on Terror and conceal its detainment of mostly innocent and 
harmless detainees. 
The Seton Hall Law Center for Policy and Research (“the 
Center”), through its review of government documents, has shown 
the inconsistencies in the government’s data on detainees and 
continued rhetorical abuse of the rates of recidivism.  Although the 
Center attempts to take government documents at face value, the 
government has been wildly inconsistent with its claims of recidivism.  
Indeed, the government’s own public statements make clear that it is 
only superficially concerned with GTMO detainees during and after 
their detainment.  As the government’s definition of “recidivism” 
becomes increasingly elaborate, the number of recidivists necessarily 
increases, and further distorts the public’s perception of GTMO.  As a 
perfect illustration of this point, although the number of unidentified 
recidivists continues to rise, the list of those confirmed and suspected 
recidivists who have been named has remained stagnant.4 
The government’s inconsistent claims of recidivism show that 
the government is either incapable of accurately identifying 
recidivists or not interested in being accurate.  The fact that only two 
new recidivists have been identified in the past three years5 reflects 
the recycling of past incidents of recidivism to create a façade that 
recidivism is an ongoing, significant problem.  The government, by 
focusing only on the stories of detainee reengagement, makes no 
effort to characterize the true nature of former detainees.  Just as 
Secretary Rumsfeld knowingly fabricated the false notion that GTMO 
was home to the worst of the worst, the government continues to 
paint that same picture despite overwhelming evidence to the 
contrary. 
The government’s outright disregard of the success stories of 
past detainees further exacerbates the ill effects of the government’s 
inaccurate reporting of recidivism.  For the first time, the Center has 
identified past detainees who have emerged from GTMO and 
become successful businessmen, students, translators, and diplomats, 
working to improve the world around them.6  These success stories, 
when compared to the government’s claims of recidivism, paint a 
more balanced perspective with respect to the nature of the people 
 
(declassified in part July 9, 2010). 
 4  See infra apps. A.1–A.8, D. 
 5  See app. A.5.   
 6  See infra Section III. 
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who were actually detained. 
Had the government actually believed that GTMO was home to 
dangerous criminals, the process of releasing detainees would reflect 
those concerns.  Its actions, however, reveal exactly the opposite.  For 
years, the release of detainees was linked directly to the detainees’ 
nationality, rather than to any risk-based assessment.7  This reaffirms 
two common trends: first, GTMO recidivism has been 
mischaracterized from the very beginning; and second, the 
government was never seriously concerned with the risk of recidivism. 
The government took a step in the right direction in March 
2012, however, when the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) 
released a new Summary of the Reengagement of Detainees Formerly 
Held at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba.8  In this new summary, the DNI 
begins to disaggregate its previously reported recidivism numbers.  By 
dividing the reengagement numbers by date (before and after 
January 22, 2009), the DNI elucidates differences between the Bush 
and Obama Administrations.9  Further, the new DNI summary details 
the number of detainees characterized as “confirmed” or “suspected” 
recidivists and divides those categories into former detainees who 
have died, are in custody, or are not in custody.10  This new summary 
informs us that fifty-five confirmed recidivists are not currently in 
custody, while forty-four suspected recidivists are not in custody.11  
Though this summary is a step in the right direction towards greater 
 
 7  See infra Section VI.C. 
 8  App. A.8.  Since the completion of this report, the DNI has released two 
additional summaries of detainee reengagement, in September 2012 and March 
2013.  There is very little difference between these two summaries and the March 
2012 summary, with the definitions of “terrorist,” “insurgent activities,” “confirmed,” 
and “suspected” remaining the same.  In the September 2012 summary, the number 
of total detainees transferred increased to 602 from 599 and the number of 
suspected of reengaging post-January 22, 2009 fell from 2 to 1.  In the March 2013 
summary, the number of total detainees transferred increased to 603 and the 
number of suspected of reengaging post-January 22, 2009 returned to 2.  See JAMES R. 
CLAPPER, DIR. NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, SUMMARY OF THE REENGAGEMENT OF DETAINEES 
FORMERLY HELD AT GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA (September 2012), available at 
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Reports%20and 
%20Pubs/Reports%20and%20Pubs%202012/Summary%20of%20the%20Reengage
ment%20of%20Detainees%20Formerly%20Held%20at%20GTMO.pdf; JAMES R. 
CLAPPER, DIR. NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, SUMMARY OF THE REENGAGEMENT OF DETAINEES 
FORMERLY HELD AT GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA (March 2013), available at 
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/March%202013%20GTMO%20Reengagemen
t%20Release.pdf. 
 9  See infra Section VI.C.3. 
 10  See app. A.8. 
 11  Id. at 1. 
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transparency, it leaves much to be desired, including the release of 
the names of recidivists, the countries to which they were released, 
why they were released, and the acts of recidivism they are alleged to 
have committed. 
The Department of Defense (DoD) has also taken a step in the 
right direction by publicly announcing its opposition to the 
prevailing practice of conflating “confirmed” and “suspected” 
recidivists into a single “recidivist” category, since a former detainee 
“suspected” of reengagement may in fact be perfectly peaceable.12  
Based on the government’s own intelligence, a public affairs officer 
admitted that combining the “confirmed” and “suspected” recidivism 
rates to reach a sum total of 27% is not appropriate because someone 
on the “suspected” list could “very possibly NOT be engaged in 
activities that are counter to our national security interests.”13 
The issue of the post-release conduct of GTMO detainees is a 
matter of policy and political significance.  If the released GTMO 
detainees transitioned into peaceful private lives, it would say a great 
deal about our judgment of who is dangerous and who is not.  
Furthermore, it would strongly suggest that GTMO never housed the 
worst of the worst.  Perhaps most importantly, placing political 
considerations ahead of honest review of the facts sabotages any 
attempt to create effective policy. 
 
II.  METHODOLOGY AND OPEN SOURCE DATABASE 
The Center’s standard practice is to utilize data gathered from 
public government documents under the assumption that they are 
accurate.  Because the government has not produced any documents 
related to non-recidivist former detainees, however, and because the 
government itself relies upon press reports for information about 
former detainees, this Report broadens the scope of available sources 
by examining various “open-source” resources as well as relying on 
public government reports.  The Center designed a database to 
 
 12  See Email from Todd Breasseale, supra note 1. 
 13  Id. (“[T]his document makes a distinction between ‘Confirmed’ v. 
‘Suspected.’  This is particularly relevant because there was confusion in some early 
media reports conflating the two, coming up with this odd 27-28% number.  To be 
sure, ‘Confirmed’ is more consistent with our actual intelligence data and 
‘Suspected’ is a much lower bar, triggering an additional review that is really more 
akin to a sort of ‘early watch’ system.  Someone on the ‘Suspected’ list could very 
possibly NOT be engaged in activities that are counter to our national security 
interests.”). 
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compile, organize, and analyze the data regarding each of the 
individuals detained in GTMO. 
For the foundation of this database, the Center utilized The New 
York Times’ “Guantánamo Docket” database of all 779 individuals 
known to have been detained at GTMO since 2002.14  The Center’s 
database collected each detainee’s name, Internment Serial Number 
(ISN), citizenship, custody status, place of birth, date of birth, date 
transferred from GTMO, and country to which the detainee was 
transferred from the “Guantánamo Docket.”  The Center also used 
the government’s list of GTMO detainees.15  It then added the public 
government information regarding twenty-nine named recidivists 
from the government’s “Return to the Fight Fact Sheet,” including 
whether, in the government’s view, the detainee was a suspected or 
confirmed recidivist.16  Finally, it supplemented the database by using 
open source information gathered from the Internet.  In doing so, 
the database collected comments from various sources, coded them 
as positive, negative, or neutral, and made a determination on the 
quality of the source. 
In order to gather anecdotes about released GTMO detainees, 
the Center conducted an Internet search of public sources.  Research 
fellows utilized the Center’s detainee database, which contains the 
names of all detainees ever held in GTMO.  The search of Internet 
sources yielded public information for 208 of the 600 released 
detainees.  This Report is a not a comprehensive list of all public 
anecdotes about released detainees.  For some detainees, there is an 
abundance of information regarding their lives after GTMO, not all 
of which has been included.  Because there is public information on 
approximately one-third of all released detainees, the sample size is 
significant.  Of course, however, the missing two-thirds may raise 
questions about its representativeness. 
 
 
 14  Andrei Scheinkman et al., The Guantanamo Docket, N.Y. TIMES, 
http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo (last visited Mar. 19, 2013).  Note that 
throughout this Report, the Center relied upon the spellings of names of detainees 
as they exists in the N.Y. Times database, rather than the spellings in the sources, to 
maintain uniformity. 
 15  U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., LIST OF INDIVIDUALS DETAINED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF 
DEFENSE AT GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA FROM JANUARY 2002 THROUGH MAY 15, 2006 
(2006) [hereinafter LIST OF INDIVIDUALS DETAINED], available at 
http://www.defense.gov/news/may2006/d20060515%20list.pdf. 
 16  See app. A.5. 
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III.  POSITIVE POST-RELEASE DETAINEE STORIES 
As detainees have been released from GTMO, many have made 
public statements.  For various reasons, news outlets have reported on 
approximately one-third of all detainees released from GTMO.17  
Many released detainees have been able to put their experiences in 
GTMO behind them and go on to live productive lives.  Some have 
gone on to careers and studies which include: author, spokesman for 
Amnesty International, student, construction worker, researcher, call 
center worker, real estate agent, landlord, lawyer, utilities company 
controller, electrician, golf groundskeeper, radio commentator, 
translator, and singer/rapper.  Despite this reality, government-
released information, including the recent House Armed Services 
Committee Report released by the House Majority, has focused solely 
on detainees that have reengaged in terrorist activities post-release.18  
This leaves the public with an incomplete picture, as a full inquiry 
into released GTMO detainees requires attention to the many success 
stories.  No government report has addressed the success of these 
former GTMO detainees. 
Many of the released detainees have been able to successfully 
transition from “enemy combatant” to productive member of society.  
Former detainee Khalid Sulaymanjaydh Javdh al Hubayshi (ISN 155), 
for example, has described his life in Jiddah, Saudi Arabia as 
“comfortably routine.  On most days, he wakes before dawn, drinks 
an espresso made by his wife and takes a 90-minute bus ride to his job 
as a controller at a utilities company.”19  He credits his successful post-
release life to the Saudi Arabian government’s assistance in helping 
him marry and get his job back.20 
One need only pause for a moment to realize how extraordinary 
these accomplishments are.  In a time where even the most qualified 
applicants have difficulties finding work in many parts of the world, 
these individuals have succeeded in the face of such a negative past.  
For some former GTMO detainees, this status—“Former 
 
 17  This figure is based on research and analysis of the Center’s aforementioned 
detainee database. 
 18  See STAFF OF H. COMM. ON ARMED SERVICES, 112TH CONG., LEAVING 
GUANTANAMO: POLICIES, PRESSURES, AND DETAINEES RETURNING TO THE FIGHT 4 
(Comm. Print 2012) [hereinafter LEAVING GUANTANAMO], available at 
http://armedservices.house.gov/index.cfm/files/serve?File_id=dd0b4c6e-528e-4138-
9755-86bae92e1cdb. 
 19  Faiza Saleh Ambah, Out of Guantanamo and Bitter Toward Bin Laden, WASH. 
POST, Mar. 24, 2008, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2008/03/23/AR2008032301594.html. 
 20  Id. 
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Guantánamo Detainee”—is likely a disqualification in the eyes of 
many employers.  For example, three different employers terminated 
Munir Bin Naseer (ISN 85) upon discovering that he had previously 
been in GTMO.21  Rather than accept the futility of his position and 
return to the war, Naseer persevered and found a position as a call 
center worker in Karachi for a Chicago mortgage broker.22 
As released detainees return to and around the war zones, some 
have chosen to work for peace and security, rather than against it.  
Taj Mohammed (ISN 902), who was already fluent in four languages 
prior to his detention, learned both Spanish and English during his 
time at GTMO.23  Mohammed now works with American soldiers in 
Afghanistan as a translator.24  When questioned about his lack of 
support for the Taliban, Mohammed responded “‘The PRT guy 
[American Provincial Reconstruction Team] makes the building, the 
school, everything.’”25  He continued, “‘The Taliban doesn’t make 
anything for us.  Stupid guy, the Taliban.’”26  Another released 
detainee, Abdul Salam Zaeef (ISN 306), is a former Afghan 
ambassador to Pakistan and has been a key figure in peace talks with 
the Taliban calling for a unity government.27 
Unlike Mohammed, most released detainees did not leave 
GTMO with a newly gained, marketable skill.  Therefore, upon their 
release, some chose to pursue further training and education.  Feroz 
Ali Abbassi (ISN 24) earned a Bachelor of Arts degree with honors in 
Social Policy from the London School of Economics.28  Hafice Leqeat 
 
 21  Tom Lasseter, Guantanamo Inmate Database: Munir Naseer, MCCLATCHY 
NEWSPAPERS (2008), http://detainees.mcclatchydc.com/detainees/12. 
 22  Id. 
 23  Karen Russo, Exclusive: Former Gitmo Detainee Now Working for U.S., ABC NEWS 
(Feb. 22, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/International/Afghanistan/guantanamo-
detainee-taj-mohammed-gitmo-now-works-americans-afghanistan/story?id=9908017# 
.T0HFtvGPXkp. 
 24  Id. 
 25  Id. (bracketed language inserted by reporter). 
 26  Id. 
 27  See generally Olaf Ihlau, Back from Guantanamo: Ex-Taliban Official Calls for Unity 
Government in Afghanistan, SPIEGEL ONLINE INT. (Apr. 12, 2007), 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,476403,00.html; Jason Straziuso, 
Taliban and Afghan Officials Break Bread, THE AGE, Oct. 7, 2008, available at 
http://news.theage.com.au/world/taliban-and-afghan-officials-break-bread-
20081007-4v9j.html. 
 28  Asim Qureshi, Cageprisoners Annual Report 2010, CAGEPRISONERS (Sept. 2, 
2010), http://www.cageprisoners.com/our-work/reports/item/515-cageprisoners-
annual-report-2010.  See also Carol Rosenberg, Newly Released Documents Reveal Fate of 
Original Guantanamo Detainees, COLLEGE TIMES, Jan. 17, 2008, available at 
http://www.ecollegetimes.com/music/newly-released-documents-reveal-fate-of-
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Manzu (ISN 139) chose to attend law school as a result of his time in 
GTMO.29  Others, like Ali Mohsen Salih (ISN 221), have studied 
trades.  Upon his release from GTMO, Salih studied to become an 
electrician, although he has noted that it has been extremely difficult 
for him to find a job as a former GTMO detainee.30 
Others have chosen more creative outlets.  Martin John 
Mubanga (ISN 10007) has acknowledged that time in GTMO “made 
me what I am—even if I’m not quite sure yet who that person is.”31  
Mubanga has channeled his experiences into music and hopes to 
release his Guantánamo-inspired rap compositions.32  Murat Kurnaz 
(ISN 61) has written a book on his experiences in GTMO, entitled 
Five Years of My Life: An Innocent Man in Guantanamo, and works as a 
city researcher in Bremen, Germany.33  David Hicks (ISN 2) has also 
written a book on his time in GTMO, entitled Guantanamo: My 
Journey.34  Most notably, Shafiq Rasul, Asif Iqbal, and Rhuhel Ahmed 
(ISNs 86, 87, and 110, respectively), commonly known as the “Tipton 
Three,” have released a documentary entitled The Road to 
Guantánamo.35 
Many released detainees have stated a desire to forget their 
experiences in GTMO and move on with their lives.36  Khaleel Mamut 
 
original-guantanamo-detainees-1.490710#.T0HVq_GPXko. 
 29  Tom Lasseter, Guantanamo Inmate Database: Hafiz Liaqat Manzoor, MCCLATCHY 
NEWSPAPERS (2008), http://detainees.mcclatchydc.com/mi_services/gitmo 
/detainees/16. 
 30  Michelle Shephard, Where Extremists Come to Play, THE STAR, Sept. 19, 2009, 
http://www.thestar.com/News/World/article/698066.  Ali Mohsen Salih is also 
known as Mohsen al-Askari.  Andy Worthington, Saleh Al Zuba (ISN 503), 
CAGEPRISONERS (Nov. 2, 2011), http://www.cageprisoners.com/cases/guantanamo-
bay/item/2590-saleh-al-zuba-isn-503. 
 31  David Rose, How I Entered the Hellish World of Guantanamo Bay, THE OBSERVER, 
Feb. 5, 2005, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2005/feb/06/world 
.guantanamo. 
 32  Id. 
 33  Matthew Schofield, Guantanamo Inmate Database: Murat Kurnaz, MCCLATCHY 
NEWSPAPERS (2008), http://detainees.mcclatchydc.com/detainees/10; MURAT 
KURNAZ, FIVE YEARS OF MY LIFE: AN INNOCENT MAN IN GUANTANAMO (2009). 
 34 David Hicks’ First Interview Details US Torture Allegations, INDEP. AUSTRALIA, Feb. 
25, 2011, available at http://www.independentaustralia.net/2011/international/ 
david-hicks-first-interview-details-us-torture-allegations/. 
 35  Matthew Schofield, Guantanamo Inmate Database: Ruhal Ahmed, MCCLATCHY 
NEWSPAPERS (2008), http://detainees.mcclatchydc.com/mi_services/gitmo/ 
detainees/65; David Rose, Using Terror to Fight Terror, THE OBSERVER (Feb. 25, 2006), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/film/2006/feb/26/features.review. 
 36  See, e.g., Schofield, supra note 35; Jumah al Dossari, I’m Home, but Still Haunted 
by Guantanamo, WASH. POST, Aug. 17, 2008, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/08/15/ 
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(ISN 278), Abdulla Abdulqadure (ISN 285), Salahidin Abdulahat 
(ISN 295), and Ablikim Turahun (ISN 320)—released detainees who 
now work as groundskeepers at a golf course in Bermuda—have 
insisted that they are not bitter about their time spent in GTMO and 
no longer want to think about the past.37 
The story for the detainees released in Kuwait has been very 
positive.  Only Abdallah Saleh Ali al Ajmi (ISN 220) does not fall into 
this category.38  According to Khaled al Odah, founder of the Kuwaiti 
Family Committee, the remaining nine released Kuwaiti detainees are 
married and he believes all have children.39  These released detainees 
are: Omar Rajab Amin (ISN 65), Nasser Najiri Amtiri (ISN 205), Saad 
Madi Saad al Azmi (ISN 571), Mohammed Finaytal al Dehani (ISN 
229), Abdullah Kamel Abudullah Kamal (ISN 228), Khalid Abdullah 
Mishal al Mutairi (ISN 213), Fouad Mahmoud al Rabiah (ISN 551), 
Abdulaziz Sayer Owain al Shammari (ISN 217), and Adel Zamel Abd 
al Mahsen al Zamel (ISN 568).40 
Alif Khan (ISN 673) most poignantly states the difficulties faced 
by released detainees choosing not to reengage upon their return.  
After refusing an offer to join the Taliban upon his release from 
GTMO, Khan stated, “[t]hey said if they got the opportunity, they 
would kill me.”41  As a result, Khan has been unable to rebuild his life 
in Afghanistan and has been forced to relocate away from his home 
and his family.42  In the face of these types of threats and hardships, it 
is impressive that so many detainees have been able to resist 
engagement or reengagement. 
It is remarkable to see how many former GTMO detainees have 
 
AR2008081502985.html. 
 37  See generally James Whittaker, “Praise be to Allah, we are in Bermuda now”—Former 
Guantanamo Bay Prisoners Swap Jumpsuits for Bermuda Shorts, TELEGRAPH, Oct. 21, 2009, 
available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/expat/expatnews/6397033/Praise-be-to-
Allah-we-are-in-Bermuda-now.html; Guantánamo’s Uighurs in Bermuda: Interviews and 
New Photos, ANDY WORTHINGTON (June 15, 2009), 
http://www.andyworthington.co.uk/2009/06/15/guantanamos-uighurs-in-bermuda-
interviews-and-new-photos/. 
 38  See infra Part VI.A. 
 39  E-mail from Jenifer Fenton, Freelance Journalist, to Mark Denbeaux (Feb. 11, 
2012, 9:41 AM EST) (on file with author).  Khaled al Odah is the father of Fouzi 
Khalid Adbullah al Awda (aka Fawzi al Odah) (ISN 232).  According to Ms. Fenton, 
Fawzi al Odah remains held in GTMO as does one other Kuwaiti, Fayiz Al Kandari 
(aka Fayiz Mohammed Ahmed al Kandari). 
 40  Id. 
 41  See Tom Lasseter, Guantanamo Inmate Database: Alif Khan, MCCLATCHY 
NEWSPAPERS (2008), http://detainees.mcclatchydc.com/detainees/36. 
 42  Id. 
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not allowed their pasts to dictate their futures.  Unfortunately, these 
stories have been conspicuously absent from government-released 
information.  Although far less exciting than reports of 
reengagement by released detainees, these positive stories are no less 
revealing.  A picture of detainee reengagement will never be 
complete until the recidivists are contrasted with the success stories. 
IV.  DEFINING RECIDIVISM 
A.  The Changing Government Definition of Recidivism 
The changing definition of detainee recidivism is just one way in 
which the government masks the true picture of post-release 
detainees.  In a DoD news release from July 2007, “recidivism” 
included those that “have returned to militant activities, participated 
in anti-U.S. propaganda or other activities through intelligence 
gathering and media reports.”43  In this release, the government 
noted that it was aware of a number of recidivists despite “not 
generally track[ing] ex-GTMO detainees after repatriation or 
resettlement.”44  The most recent government definition of recidivism 
from the March 2012 DNI Summary is more elaborate: 
Definition of “Terrorist” or “Insurgent” Activities.  Activities 
such as the following indicate involvement in terrorist or 
insurgent activities: planning terrorist operations, conducting 
a terrorist or insurgent attack against Coalition or host-nation 
forces or civilians, conducting a suicide bombing, financing 
terrorist operations, recruiting others for terrorist 
operations, arranging for movement of individuals involved 
in terrorist operations. It does not include mere 
communications with individuals or organizations—including 
other former GTMO detainees—on issues not related to 
terrorist operations, such as reminiscing over shared 
experiences at GTMO, communicating with past terrorist 
associates about non-nefarious activities, writing anti-U.S. 
books or articles, or making anti-U.S. propaganda 
statements.45 
To be a “confirmed” case of recidivism requires “[a] 
preponderance of information which identifies a specific former 
GTMO detainee as directly involved in terrorist or insurgent 
 
 43  See infra app. A.2. 
 44  See infra app. A.2. 
 45  See app. A.8, at 2 (emphasis added to highlight changes from previous 
definitions).  The 2012 definition closely resembles the definition from 2010.  See 
infra app. A.6. 
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activities.”46  To be considered a “suspected” recidivist requires 
“[p]lausible but unverified or single-source reporting indicating a 
specific former GTMO detainee is directly involved in terrorist or 
insurgent activities.”47 
The newer definitions expand the scope of recidivism to include 
“insurgent” activities.  The 2010 and 2012 definitions also include for 
the first time language involving insurgent activities that have been 
alleged to have been conducted against “Coalition or host-nation 
forces.”  This appears to refer to the situation in Afghanistan, though 
it is unclear whether the elements following this in the definition 
(suicide bombings, financing terrorist operations, etc.) are also in 
reference to Afghanistan.  If so, this would contradict previous 
reports of recidivism, which included actions carried out in other 
countries, such as Russia, and which were not attacks against the 
United States, the Coalition, or Afghan forces.  The evolution of the 
standard by which recidivism is defined is discussed below in Part 
IV.B. 
The 2012 summary also asserts, consistent with the government’s 
April 2009 statement, that the definition of recidivism does not 
consider “mere communications” or “writing anti-U.S. books or 
articles, or making anti-U.S. propaganda statements” to be recidivist 
acts.48  This contradicts past reports on recidivism, which expressly 
included anti-U.S. propaganda in the definition.49  In fact, the 2007 
report cited as examples of anti-American behavior the “Tipton 
 
 46  See app. A.8.  On its face, this would seem to be no different from “direct 
participation in hostilities” in non-international armed conflict.  See generally NILS 
MELZER, INT’L REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF 
DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 
(2009), available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc-872-reports-
documents.pdf.  Harold Koh, Legal Adviser to the Secretary of State, has stated, 
however, that the United States is in compliance with the International Committee of 
the Red Cross (ICRC) interpretive guidance, which excludes mere “recruiters, 
trainers, financiers and propagandists” who have no direct nexus to hostilities, as 
would planning or commanding.  Harold Koh, Legal Adviser, Dep’t of State, The 
Obama Administration and International Law, Keynote Address at the Annual 
Meeting of the American Soc’y of Int’l Law (Mar. 25, 2010) (“[O]ur general 
approach of looking at ‘functional’ membership in an armed group has been 
endorsed not only by the federal courts, but also is consistent with the approach 
taken in the targeting context by the ICRC in its recent study on Direct Participation 
in Hostilities (DPH).”).  Koh’s statements seem to be in conflict with the DNI 
definition of “confirmed” recidivist, as the DNI defines “directly involved” to include 
recruiters, trainers, and financiers. 
 47  App. A.8. 
 48  App. A.8, at 2. 
 49  See infra app. A. 
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Three” and their discussions of their experiences in GTMO for 
Michael Winterbottom’s commercial film, The Road to Guantánamo.50  
Because of the government’s failure to identify individuals, however, 
it remains unclear whether the government has retroactively 
accounted for the change in definition and subtracted those who did 
not engage in terrorist attacks, but participated only in propaganda. 
In stark contrast to previous DNI summaries, the 2012 summary 
attempts to break down the recidivism numbers in table form.51  
Specifically, the table lists the reengagement numbers before and 
after January 22, 2009 (to coincide with an Executive Order issued by 
President Obama).52  This date also coincides with President Obama 
entering into office, providing a clearer view of reengagement 
numbers during the Bush and Obama Administrations.  Thus, since 
President Obama took office, of the 67 total releases, three detainees 
are confirmed recidivists (4.5%) while 2 are suspected (3%).53  Under 
President Bush’s tenure, 532 detainees were released, 92 of which are 
confirmed recidivists (17.3%), while 70 are suspected (13.2%).54  In 
addition, the table shows that the DNI considers deceased former 
detainees when compiling the recidivist numbers.55  In total, of the 
599 detainees released from GTMO, 95 are listed as confirmed 
recidivists (15.9%), while 72 are suspected recidivists (12%).56 
Finally, and notably, the 2010 and 2012 DNI summaries differed 
from previous summaries57 because they offered an assessment of the 
likelihood that detainees will “engage in terrorism” and 
“communicate with persons in terrorist organizations.”58  The DNI 
concluded that if additional detainees are transferred without specific 
conditions met, “some will reengage.”59  The DNI also noted that 
transfers to countries with instability and ongoing conflicts pose “a 
particular problem.”60  Further, the DNI acknowledged that former 
GTMO detainees “routinely communicate with each other” but the 
 
 50  See infra app. A.1. 
 51  See app. A.8, at 1. 
 52  Id. 
 53  Id. 
 54  Id. 
 55  Id. 
 56  Id. 
 57  The December 2010 summary contains similar language, though there are a 
number of differences in the wording of the March 2012 summary.  Compare app. 
A.7, with app. A.8. 
 58  See app. A.8, at 2. 
 59  Id. (emphasis added). 
 60  Id. 
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reasons “span from the mundane . . . to the nefarious.”61  In assessing 
whether or not a detainee has reengaged, the DNI explains that “the 
motives, intentions, and purposes of each communication are taken 
into account.”62 
B.  Expansive by Definition 
The language used by the government and other officials in 
recent years described alleged recidivists as “returning to the 
battlefield.”63  Alternatively, the issue had been framed as recidivists 
“return[ing] to militant activities.”64  Beginning with the June 2008 
report, the DoD started using the more general phrase “reengaging 
in terrorism” for recidivism.65  In contrast, the 2010 summary 
considers activities against Coalition or host-nation forces to be acts 
of recidivism.66  This language of “reengagement,” “terrorism,” 
“insurgent,” and “host-nation” retreats from the obvious earlier 
implication that a detainee had to have engaged in acts against the 
United States or Coalition forces for the DoD to consider him a 
recidivist.  This category change may have increased the number of 
those qualifying recidivists.  The shift also indicates that the 
government has moved away from limiting “return to the fight” in 
terms of Afghanistan and Iraq.  For instance, when Pentagon 
spokesman Geoff Morrell discussed with reporters detainees 
“returning to the fight” he stated, “[t]his is [sic] acts of terrorism.  It 
could be Iraq, Afghanistan, it could be acts of terrorism around the 
world.”67  Whatever the legitimacy of this classification system in the 
abstract, it does not address the public’s concern that detainees 
released from GTMO might return to the battlefield against U.S. 
soldiers. 
According to the current definition, a detainee has “reengaged” 
if he is directly involved in any terrorist or insurgent activities against 
host nation or Coalition forces.68  It is unclear how “host nation” 
 
 61  Id. 
 62  Id. 
 63  See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 828 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“At 
least 30 of those prisoners hitherto released from Guantanamo Bay have returned to 
the battlefield.”) (emphasis added). 
 64  See infra app. A.2. 
 65  See app. A.4. 
 66  See infra app. A.6. 
 67  See David Morgan, Pentagon: 61 Ex-Guantanamo Inmates Return to Terrorism, Jan. 
13, 2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSTRE50C5JX 
20090113. 
 68  App. A.8, supra note 4, at 2. 
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should be interpreted.  If it means Afghanistan, then it is redundant, 
since Afghanistan is listed as a member of the Coalition.  If it means 
the place of release or transfer, then it is extraordinarily expansive. 
For example, applying this definition to the five Russian 
recidivists highlights several critical flaws.  First, by allowing actions by 
foreign citizens against their own governments to fall under the 
insurgent activities against a host country definition, the government 
is greatly expanding the concept of recidivism.  The Russian 
recidivists were Russian citizens that the United States returned to the 
Russian government, who then refused to detain or prosecute them 
for actions related to the reason for their holding in GTMO.69  The 
former detainees then committed acts against the Russian 
government (in connection with the Chechnya conflict).70  It is 
difficult to comprehend why this scenario concerns the U.S. 
government enough to qualify it as recidivism in the context of the 
Coalition’s fight against al Qaeda.  Though there is a supposed link 
between Chechen rebels and al Qaeda,71 the in-fighting between 
Russia and Chechnya is arguably unrelated to U.S. and Coalition 
fears of recidivism.  Further, Russia has only supplied minimal 
support for the Coalition,72 so it cannot be argued that the actions of 
the Russian recidivists are directed at the Coalition or United States. 
Including acts against host-nations allows recidivism to 
encompass much more conduct than a U.S. or Coalition-specific 
definition and supports a conclusion that the government’s actual 
goal is to report increasingly higher recidivism numbers.  Earlier 
reports were always framed as acts against the United States.73  This is 
confirmed by the fact that the scope of conduct the DoD included in 
 
 69  See app. A.4. 
 70  See id. 
 71  Thomas de Waal, Greetings from Grozny—Fighting for Chechnya: Is Islam a Factor?, 
PBS WIDEANGLE (July 25, 2002), http://www.pbs.org/wnet/wideangle/episodes/ 
greetings-from-grozny/fighting-for-chechnya-is-islam-a-factor/3078/; see also, U.S. 
Supports Work of OSCE Assistance Group to Chechnya, RELIEFWEB (June 7, 2002), 
http://reliefweb.int/report/russian-federation/us-supports-work-osce-assistance-
group-chechnya (providing a transcript of the Ambassador’s statement, Org. for Sec. 
& Cooperation in Eur. [OSCE], Ambassador Stephan Minikes, Statement on Chechnya, 
June 6, 2002). 
 72  See DEP’T OF DEF., FACT SHEET: INTERNATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE WAR 
AGAINST TERROR (June 2002) [hereinafter DOD FACT SHEET], available at 
http://www.defense.gov/news/Jun2002/d20020607contributions.pdf. 
 73  See infra apps. A.1 (returned to terrorism focused on harming U.S. or allied 
interests.”), A.2 (“each returned to combat against the U.S. and its allies . . .”); app. 
A.4 (“reengaged in local, tactical-level, anti-coalition activity” and “no indication he 
was a member of any terrorist organization or posed a risk to U.S. or Allied 
interests”). 
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“returning to the fight” once extended to those former detainees who 
had merely “spoken critically of the Government’s detention policy.”74 
This expansive notion of recidivism serves only to confuse policy 
debates and inflame political rhetoric.  Given the history of inflated 
and politically-driven reporting of recidivism, as discussed below, it is 
fair to ask whether the most recent definition is also politically 
motivated. 
V.  CLAIMS OF RECIDIVISM 
As detainees have been released from GTMO, government 
officials have made upwards of fifty public statements regarding the 
behavior of these released detainees.  Senior administration officials 
and members of Congress, including members of the Senate Armed 
Services Committee, made many of these statements orally.  In 
addition, the Department of Defense and the Director of National 
Intelligence have produced a series of written reports about released-
detainee recidivism.  This multitude of information has provided the 
public with a confusing and conflicting picture.  In early consecutive 
reports, the number of recidivists varied from two to ten, then to 
twelve, back down to six, and then back to two, only to rise again.75  






 74  MARK DENBEAUX ET AL., CTR. FOR POLICY & RESEARCH, JUSTICE SCALIA, THE 
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, AND THE PERPETUATION OF AN URBAN LEGEND: THE TRUTH 
ABOUT THE ALLEGED RECIDIVISM OF RELEASED GUANTÁNAMO DETAINEES 6 (2008), 
available at http://law.shu.edu/publications/guantanamoReports/urban_legend 
_final_63008.pdf. 
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(HASC), the December 2010 summary stated that 150 detainees have 
reengaged in terrorist or insurgent activities.82  A more recent 
statement claimed that 161 of the 599 released detainees have 
reengaged, amounting to 27%.83  The HASC then published a report 
reiterating this claim.84  A DoD spokesman, however, recently 
characterized this as an “odd” conflation of two distinct categories, 
and indicated that the most recent trustworthy rate is 15.9%.85  
Furthermore, a timeline of publicly cited numbers reveals sudden, 
unexplained spikes and decreases, as well as a large and persistent 
discrepancy between the number cited by public officials and actual 
names of those detainees “confirmed” as having committed post-
release terrorist acts.86 
A.  The Government Can Only Name Fifteen “Confirmed” Recidivists, 
but Not All Were Detained At GTMO and Not All Engaged in Post-
Detention Attacks Against the United States or Coalition Forces 
The various DoD statements regarding the number of recidivist 
detainees consistently fail to identify the overwhelming majority of 
alleged recidivists, and these statements have proven particularly 
unreliable in the past.  For example, in the July 12, 2007 DoD press 
release, the recidivist figure reported by the DoD in April 2007 of 
thirty was reduced to five.87  Specifically, in that report, the DoD 
identified seven prisoners by name, but two of those seven were never 
in GTMO.88 
 
 82  LEAVING GUANTANAMO, supra note 18 at 10 (“It was reported as 25 percent 
(150 detainees) [had reengaged] as of October 2010.”) 
 83  See app. A.7. 
 84  LEAVING GUANTANAMO, supra note 18. 
 85  Todd Breasseale, supra note 1; app. A.8, at 1. 
 86  See infra app. B. 
 87  See MARK DENBEAUX ET AL., CTR. FOR POLICY & RESEARCH, RELEASED 
GUANTÁNAMO DETAINEES AND THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE: PROPAGANDA BY THE 
NUMBERS? 4 (2009) [hereinafter PROPAGANDA BY THE NUMBERS], available at 
http://law.shu.edu/publications/guantanamoReports/propaganda_numbers_11509
.pdf. 
 88  Id. 
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The April 2009 “Fact Sheet” from the DoD reviewed “specific 
cases” which were identified in the May 2008 DoD report.  This list is 
notable for several reasons, all of which raise concerns regarding the 
consistency, strength, and accuracy of the DoD’s recidivism claims.  
The April 2009 DoD report, using data from May 2008, asserted that 
twenty-seven former GTMO detainees had been confirmed as 
“reengaging in terrorist activities” and an additional forty-seven were 
“suspected” of reengaging in terrorist activity.89  Of the seventy-four 
alleged recidivists, however, the DoD provided names for only twenty-
nine detainees.  Of those twenty-nine names, only fifteen were 
“confirmed” as recidivists, at least according to the government.90  Of 
the fifteen “confirmed,” one does not appear on the list of detainees 
in GTMO.91  Further, two were Russian nationals whose post-
detention activities occurred in Russia with no ostensible connection 
the United States.92  After the May 2008 data, the government has not 
identified by name or ISN any additional alleged recidivists until the 
HASC Report released by the House Majority.93 
 
 89  See app. A.5. 
 90  See id. 
 91  Compare id., with LIST OF INDIVIDUALS DETAINED, supra note 15. 
 92  See app. A.4.  The nationalities of named “confirmed” detainees who can be 
verified as former GTMO detainees are: Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia (3); Morocco, 
Russia (2); Kuwait (1), Turkey (1), Bahrain (1), Pakistan (1).  LIST OF INDIVIDUALS 
DETAINED, supra note 15. 
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B.  A Pattern of Errors 
The U.S. government has been releasing names of former 
GTMO detainees deemed to be recidivists since 2006.  While a total 
of thirty-one detainees have been identified as recidivists, only two 
additional names (Medhi Mohammad Ghezali (ISN 166) and 
Othman Ahmed Othman al Omairah (ISN 184)) have been 
identified since 2009.94  The remaining lists of detainees (released in 
2006, 2007, May 2008, June 2008, and 2009) are highly repetitive.  
While each time the government presents its information as new, it 
has failed or refused to identify most of the claimed recidivists, thus 
frustrating any efforts at independent verification of the claims. 
Five detainees have been on each of the government’s lists from 
2006 to 2009.  Mohammed Ismail, Mohammed Yusif Yaqub (aka 
Mullah Shazada), Shai Jahn Ghafoor (aka Maulavi Abdul Ghaffar), 
and Mohammed Nayim Farouq all appear on the 2006, 2007, May 
2008, June 2008, and 2009 recidivists lists.95  Abdullah Mahsud 
appears on the 2007, June 2008, and 2009 lists under that name, and 
on the July 2006, May 2008, and 2009 lists as Said Mohammed Alim 
Shah.96 
While the 2007 list identified seven alleged recidivists, only two 
men (Noor and Odijev) had not appeared on previous lists.97  At the 
same time, two others previously identified were omitted.  Similarly, 
the May 2008 list included a dozen names, yet only five had not 
appeared on earlier lists, and one of the 2007 additions was omitted.98  
In June 2008 the government released a list of thirteen alleged 
recidivists.99  None of these thirteen men were newly identified 
recidivists.  In fact, seven of them were included on the first list 
released in 2006.100 
A subsequent list of alleged recidivists was released in April 2009, 
which identified twenty-nine former detainees who had reengaged in 
terrorism.101  This was the most significant step forward since fifteen 
were newly identified and had not appeared on earlier lists.  
Nevertheless, it remains true that the vast majority of claimed 
 
 94  LEAVING GUANTANAMO, supra note 18. 
 95  See infra apps. A.1–A.5 (but note in A3 that Mullah Shazada is listed by an alias 
Mohamed Yusif Yaqub). 
 96  See infra apps. A.1–A.5.  
 97  See infra app. A.2. 
 98  See infra app. A.3. 
 99  See app. A.4. 
 100  See infra app. A.1. 
 101  See app. A.5. 
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recidivists have not been named and therefore their statuses cannot 
be verified.  The government claims there are high numbers of 
GTMO detainees who have reengaged in terrorism, yet it continues 
to release inconsistent lists of recidivists using old data and stale 
information. 
The use of stale data is troubling for a number of reasons.  First, 
the reliance on stale recidivism data to assert that recidivism is an 
ongoing problem mischaracterizes the perceived threat.  Including 
past recidivists on a list of current recidivists conflates two distinctly 
different problems—one a past problem of recidivism, the other a 
current recidivism problem.  In this regard, rather than assessing the 
total number of recidivists, the appropriate inquiry should focus on 
how many new recidivists there are.  After all, policy reflects perceived 
future threat.102  If the government discovered the bulk of recidivists 
years ago, then the threat of recidivism looks relatively minor.  If the 
government discovers new recidivists but does not announce them, 
then the threat is that much greater. 
The DNI has hinted at this point on several occasions by noting 
the fact that the overall recidivism rate (whether suspected or 
confirmed) includes those who are dead or captured.103  These hints 
have apparently been insufficient to affect policymakers’ views of the 
risk involved in releasing GTMO detainees, as demonstrated by the 
HASC report’s aggregation of all confirmed and suspected recidivists 
into a single recidivism rate.104  The DNI’s failure to parse in full the 
recidivist data leads to the overestimation of risk.  This problem could 
be solved by an indication of the estimated future risk, though no 
government agency has attempted to do this to date. 
Second, the use of stale data reaffirms the notion that the 
government is superficially concerned about the post-release 
behavior of detainees.  The cumulative effect of recycling old data 
distorts the public’s perception of how bad the recidivism rate 
actually is.  The exaggeration of the recidivism problem, 
accomplished through the use of stale data, is consistent with the 
government’s exploitation of information for political gain.  In short, 
claiming a high rate of recidivism is a continuation of the 
government’s assertion that GTMO housed the “worst of the worst.” 
 
 102  App. A.8 (DNI is tasked with providing an unclassified summary of: “an 
assessment of the likelihood that [current or formerly held] detainees will engage in 
terrorism or communicate with persons in terrorist organizations.”) (emphasis 
added). 
 103  See, e.g., app. A.7; see also app. A.8. 
 104  See LEAVING GUANTANAMO, supra note 18. 
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Also troubling are the internal inconsistencies of the lists 
provided.  Each of the DoD’s four lists of names differs widely from 
the others in ways that cannot be explained by the passage of time.  
In terms of “confirmed” names, the number of names has remained 
within the range of seven to fifteen, while the alleged total, mostly 
comprised of unnamed individuals, has grown disproportionately.105  
Often, individual names are spelled inconsistently.  Only five of the 
detainees appear on all five lists,106 and of those five, two (Mohammed 
Nayim Farouq and Ruslan Odijev (aka Ruslan Anatolivich Odijev)) 
are among the three detainees downgraded to “suspected” status in 
the April 2009 report.107  Thus, only three of the seven originally 
“confirmed” recidivists are consistently “confirmed.”  These status 
changes call into question the accuracy of every previous list, since 
they directly contradict them all. 
Three of the cases discussed in the April 2009 DoD report reflect 
a major reversal from its previous report.  Specifically, the statuses of 
at least three former detainees were changed from “confirmed 
reengagement” to “suspected reengagement.”  This is significant 
because “unverified or single-source . . . reporting” is sufficient to 
classify a person as “suspected” of “reengaging in terrorist 
activities.”108 
Ruslan Anatolivich Odijev (aka “Ruslan Odizhev”): Ruslan 
Odijev, a Russian, was reportedly killed in a June 2007 battle 
with Russia’s federal Security Service.  Russian authorities 
stated that Odijev participated in several terrorist acts, 
including an attack in October 2005 in the Caucasus region.  
His status as “returned to the fight” has been changed, 
without explanation, to “suspected reengagement.”109 
 
Shai Jahn Abdul Ghafoor (aka “Maulvi Abdul Ghaffar”): 
Ghaffar was reportedly “killed in a raid by Afghan security 
forces” in September 2004.  The DoD reports that Ghaffar 
became the Taliban’s regional commander in the Uruzgan 
and Helmand provinces and carried out attacks against U.S. 
and Afghan forces.  As of the April 2009 DoD report, 
however, Ghaffar’s status has been changed from “returned 
to the fight” to “suspected.”110  In addition, as previously 
 
 105  Compare infra apps. A.1–A.8, with infra app. B. 
 106  See app. C. 
 107  App. A.5. 
 108  See app. A.4; app. A.5. 
 109  Compare app. A.2, with app. A.5. 
 110  Compare app. A.2, with app. A.5. 
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reported by the Center, his name does not appear on the 
list of detainees in GTMO.  While there are two detainees 
with similar names, both were still imprisoned when 
Ghaffar was allegedly killed.111 
 
Mohammed Nayim Farouq: According to the Department 
of Defense, Farouq, who was released from GTMO before 
the Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRT) were 
convened, “has since become re-involved in anti-coalition 
militant activity,” but has neither been recaptured nor 
killed.112 
These former detainees were changed from “confirmed” to 
“suspected” without comment.  It is unclear why, considering that a 
July 2007 news release from the DoD listed each of the above three 
detainees as examples of those who “returned to combat against the 
U.S. and its allies after being released from [GTMO].”113  Presumably, 
these individuals are included in the total of seventy-four reported in 
the April 2009 DoD report and in the December 2010 summary.  
Given this fact, the flux between these two categories of recidivism 
and the public concern of the overall number asserted by the DoD 
creates a serious question as to the consistency of reporting on 
recidivism. 
Indeed, this change in status can only reflect one of two 
possibilities: (1) either these detainees were always merely 
“suspected” recidivists previously reported as “confirmed,” or (2) the 
DoD has found cause to doubt its own previous evidence upon which 
the “confirmed” status was based.  An additional detainee, Abdul 
Rahman Noor, appeared in the first list in July 2007: 
Abdul Rahman Noor: The DoD previously claimed that 
Noor participated in fighting against U.S. forces near 
Kandahar.  The DoD described Noor as participating in a 
video interview with al-Jazeera television, wherein he was 
identified as the “deputy defense minister of the Taliban.”114 
As of the April 7, 2009 report, Noor is no longer listed as a 
recidivist—neither confirmed nor suspected.115  This may indicate 
that the DoD agrees with earlier assertions that Mr. Noor was not 
 
 111  LIST OF INDIVIDUALS DETAINED, supra note 15. 
 112  See app. A.5.  Those that are dead or captured are noted as such under 
“Activity”; because Farouq’s activity indicates neither, it can be presumed that the 
government believes he is not dead or captured. 
 113  See infra app. A.2. 
 114  See app. A.4. 
 115  See app. A.5. 
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“ever officially detained at Guantánamo.”116  In any event, this 
additional DoD shift further raised serious questions regarding the 
consistency and accuracy of the DoD allegations, and has not been 
explained in the most recent summary. 
In addition, the DoD maintained another inconsistency 
described in earlier reports: 
Mohammed Yusif Yaqub (aka Mullah Shazada): According 
to the Department of Defense, Mullah Shazada “was killed 
on 7 May 2004 fighting against U.S. forces.”117  The name 
Mullah Shazada, however, does not appear on the official 
list of detainees.118 
It is not at all clear that Shazada is actually a former GTMO 
detainee.119  After Shazada’s death, the government announced that 
he had been previously detained in GTMO under the name 
“Mohamed Yusif Yaqub.”120 
In the July 2007 DoD news release, the five Uighurs—ethnic 
Chinese who practice Islam—relocated to Albania were listed as 
examples of former detainees engaging in recidivist activity.121  No 
press release from the DoD since has retracted that earlier assertion.  
However, first-hand accounts dispute this allegation.  Hidajet Cera, 
director of the refugee camp to which the Uighers were sent, 
described the former detainees as “the best guys in the place” who 
“have never given us one minute’s problem.”122  The five Uighers no 
longer live in the refugee camp, and local news reports indicate that 
each one is living relatively normal lives, such as working as a pizza-
maker.123  Further, the U.S. has admitted in open court that none of 
the Uighurs detained in GTMO are threats to national security, and 
 
 116  See MARK DENBEAUX ET AL., CTR. FOR POLICY & RESEARCH, THE MEANING OF 
“BATTLEFIELD”: AN ANALYSIS OF THE GOVERNMENT’S REPRESENTATIONS OF “BATTLEFIELD” 
CAPTURE AND “RECIDIVISM” OF THE GUANTÁNAMO DETAINEES 12 (2007), available at 
http://law.shu.edu/publications/guantanamoReports/meaning_of_battlefield_final
_121007.pdf. 
 117  See app. A.5. 
 118  LIST OF INDIVIDUALS DETAINED, supra note 15. 
 119  See PROPAGANDA BY THE NUMBERS, supra note 87, at 5. 
 120  See app. A.5. 
 121  See infra app. A.2. 
 122  Jonathan Finer, After Guantanamo, An Empty Freedom, WASH. POST, Oct. 17, 
2007, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/ 
10/16/AR2007101602078.html. 
 123  Nate Tabak, Former Guantánamo Detainee Now Making Pizza in Albania, PRI’S 
THE WORLD (Feb. 7, 2013), http://www.theworld.org/2013/02/uighur-guantanamo-
detainee-albania/. 
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all but three have been released.124 
One of the Uighur men, however, did write an opinion piece, 
published in The New York Times, in which he urged American 
lawmakers to protect habeas corpus.125  This may be the basis of listing 
the Uighurs as recidivists since the DoD has sometimes designated 
political opposition as “anti-coalition militant activity.”126 
Additionally, in November 2010 a former detainee, Jaber Jubran 
al-Faifi (ISN 188), reportedly tipped off Yemeni officials to a bomb 
plot involving devices planted in printer cartridges and sent via air 
cargo.127  Al-Faifi was incarcerated at GTMO until 2007, when he was 
repatriated to Saudi Arabia.  He reportedly rejoined al Qaeda and 
made his way to Yemen, before turning himself in November and 
reporting the bombing plot. 
Under the definition of recidivism in the 2012 DNI summary, al-
Faifi was likely counted as reengaging in terrorist activities after he 
was said to have rejoined al Qaeda.  The summary does not make 
clear whether blowing the whistle on a terrorist bombing plot would 
remove al-Faifi from the ranks of recidivists.  Because the summary 
does not list names of suspected or confirmed recidivists, al-Faifi’s 
status in this count is unknown. 
Hajji Sahib Rohullah Wakil (ISN 798), an Afghani released from 
GTMO in April 2008, was classified as a recidivist by the government 
on its 2009 list of recidivist detainees.128  Wakil’s alleged recidivist act, 
however, is a mere loose association with al Qaeda as a result of his 
political activities, not terroristic acts.  Wakil is a tribal leader in 
Afghanistan, who works closely with the Afghani government to 
advocate for the needs of his home province, Kunar province.129  He 
works with the country’s president, Karzai, who has nothing but 
praise for Wakil.130 
 
 124  Charlie Savage, Two Guantánamo Detainees Freed, the First in 15 Months, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 19, 2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/20/world/ 
americas/2-guantanamo-bay-detainees-freed-in-el-salvador.html. 
 125  Abu Bakker Qassim, The View From Guantánamo, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2006, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/17/opinion/17qassim.html. 
 126  See infra app. A.2. 
 127  See, e.g., Yemen Tip-Off Came from Ex-Gitmo Detainee, Officials Say, NBC NEWS 
(Nov. 1, 2010), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/39947157/ns/us_news-security/ 
#.USPpVaV9BWw. 
 128  See app. A.5. 
 129  Nancy A. Youssef, Where’s Pentagon “terrorism suspect”? Talking to Karzai, 
MCCLATCHY NEWSPAPERS (July 7, 2009), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2009/07/07/ 
71434/wheres-pentagon-terrorism-suspect.html. 
 130  Id. 
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Similarly, the government has identified Mehdi Mohammad 
Ghezali (ISN 166) as a recidivist and Pakistani officials arrested him 
because of his alleged ties to al Qaeda, claiming that a local police 
chief had referred to him as “a very dangerous man.”131  In late 2009, 
however, it was reported that Ghezali’s arrest was a 
misunderstanding, and he had been part of a group making a 
pilgrimage to celebrate Ramadan, and was arrested with a fellow 
Swedish couple and their two-year-old son.132 
Without speculating as to what conclusions might be drawn from 
these types of inconsistencies, they are typical of the DoD releases.  
None is free from error. 
VI.  GOVERNMENT METHODS OF DETAINEE RELEASE HAVE 
CONTRIBUTED TO RECIDIVISM 
A.  The Worst Error 
In gaining a fuller picture of the post-release behavior of former 
GTMO detainees, it is not necessary to diminish the role of those who 
do in fact reengage in criminal and militant activity hostile to U.S. 
interests.  The dangerous nature of some detainees is a reason for 
fully informed policy debate.  Indeed, lacking such debate, the 
government’s policy decisions have led to the release of some 
individuals for whom reengagement seems inevitable.  Some of the 
more compelling cases are included below. 
Unsurprisingly, many alleged recidivists are Afghans taking 
direct part in the civil war in Afghanistan.  Abdullah Mehsud (ISN 
92) returned to Afghanistan on March 14, 2004.133  It is unclear why 
the U.S. released Mehsud, a known Taliban fighter,134 who “quickly 
took up arms again, leading local and foreign militants in Pakistan’s 
 
 131  LEAVING GUANTANAMO, supra note 18, at 35. 
 132  David Jonasson, Swedish Former Guantanamo Prisoner Arrested in Pakistan, 
STOCKHOLM NEWS (Sept. 10, 2009), http://www.stockholmnews.com/more.aspx? 
NID=3945#; David Landes, Lawyers Explain Pakistan Trip by ‘Guantanamo Swede,’ THE 
LOCAL (Sweden) (Nov. 23, 2009), http://www.thelocal.se/23416/20091123 
/#.URxuT6V9BWw. 
 133  Andrei Scheinkman et al., The Guantanamo Docket: Abdullah Mehsud, N.Y. 
TIMES, http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo/detainees/92-abdullah-mehsud 
(last visited Mar. 19, 2013). 
 134  If the US Administration had Behaved Intelligently, Ex-Guantánamo Inmate who Blew 
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South Waziristan[.]”135  According to the government, Mehsud blew 
himself up with a hand grenade136 to avoid capture in July 2007.137 
Mohamed Yusif Yaqub, aka Mullah Shazada (ISN 367),138 was 
supposedly released to Afghanistan in May 2003.139  The government 
lists him as a confirmed recidivist and Taliban commander in 
Afghanistan who organized a jailbreak in Kandahar and was killed in 
May 2004 fighting U.S. forces.140  Yaqub reportedly used a fake name 
in GTMO and claimed to be an innocent rug merchant.141  After his 
release, he seized control of Taliban operations in south Afghanistan, 
recruiting fighters by telling tales of mistreatment in GTMO.142 
The government released Abdullah Gulam Rasoul (ISN 8) to 
Afghanistan in December 2007.  Rasoul is listed as a suspected 
recidivist and Taliban military commander for Afghanistan who 
organized an assault on U.S. military aircraft in Afghanistan.143  
Another source reports that Rasoul, under the name Mullah 
Abdullah Zakir, is a top operations officer for the Taliban in southern 
Afghanistan.144 
Several other alleged recidivists are Saudis who were subject to 
Saudi Arabia’s rehabilitation program but thereafter purportedly 
traveled to Yemen to join al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula 
(“AQAP”).  For example, Othman Ahmed Othman al Omairah (ISN 
184), a citizen of Yemen, was repatriated to Saudi Arabia on June 24, 
2006, and was put through the Saudi rehabilitation program.145  He 
 
 135  Abdul Sattar, Pakistani Militant Leader Is Killed, WASH. POST, July 24, 2007, 
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/07/24 
/AR2007072400521.html. 
 136  The government document does not say how he killed himself, but this source 
specifies he killed himself with a hand grenade.  Id. 
 137  See app. A.5. 
 138  See infra app. A.1. 
 139  It is still unclear whether Mohammed Yusif Yaqub also went by Mullah 
Shazada. 
 140  See app. A.5. 
 141  WikiLeaks and the Guantánamo Prisoners Released from 2002 to 2004 (Part Five of 
Ten), ANDY WORTHINGTON (July 25, 2011), http://www.andyworthington.co.uk/2011 
/07/25/wikileaks-and-the-guantanamo-prisoners-released-from-2002-to-2004-part-
five-of-ten/.  Wikileaks’ information was not used for this report, nor is the 
information taken from Worthington’s article based on Wikileaks’ information. 
 142  Id. 
 143  See app. A.5. 
 144  Pamela Hess, Abdullah Ghulam Rasoul, Former Gitmo Detainee, Now A Taliban 
Leader, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 10, 2009), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/03 
/10/abdullah-ghulam-rasoul-fo_n_173690.html. 
 145  Andy Worthington, Othman Al Ghamdi (ISN 184), CAGEPRISONERS (Oct. 31, 
2011), http://www.cageprisoners.com/cases/guantanamo-bay/item/2526-othman-
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soon disappeared, and in February 2009 he was included as one of 
eleven former GTMO prisoners on the Saudi most wanted militant 
list.146  In May 2010, an al Qaeda video featured al Omairah, 
describing him as an “operational commander.”147 
Mazin Salih Musaid al Awfi (ISN 154) and Said Ali al Shihri (ISN 
372) are alleged leadership figures in AQAP.148  According to one 
source, Yemeni authorities arrested al Awfi in 2009 after he appeared 
in a video with al Shihri.149  Al Shihri has yet to be captured and is 
believed to be the deputy leader of AQAP.150  He may have been 
involved in the attack on the U.S. Embassy in Yemen in September 
2008.151 
Among those recidivists not named on the government’s various 
lists but discovered by the Center from public sources are Saudis 
Yusef Mohammed Mubarak al Shihri (ISN 114), Fahd Salih Sulayman 
al Jutavyli (ISN 177), and Ibrahim Sulayman Arbaysh (ISN 192). 
Yusef al Shihri, brother-in-law of Said al Shihiri (ISN 372), was 
reportedly killed by Saudi forces crossing from Yemen to Saudi 
Arabia, while disguised as a woman and wearing a suicide bomb 
belt.152  The Saudi Interior Ministry reported that DNA tests had 
confirmed that al Jutayli, released in 2007, was one of the several 
militants killed on September 14, 2009,153 when a bomb under 
construction accidentally detonated.154  Arbaysh was placed in a 
reintegration program, but traveled to Yemen and is now reportedly a 
 
al-ghamdi-isn-184. 
 146  Id. 
 147  Id.  See also Thomas Joscelyn, Former Gitmo Detainee Featured as Commander in al 
Qaeda Tape, LONG WAR J. (May 28, 2010), http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives 
/2010/05/former_gitmo_detaine_4.php. 
 148  See app. A.5. 
 149  Yemen Arrests al Qaeda Member Once Held at Gitmo, CNN WORLD (Feb. 18, 2009), 
http://articles.cnn.com/2009-02-18/world/al.qaeda.arrest_1_qaeda-saudi-arabia-
facility-at-guantanamo-bay. 
 150  Thomas Joscelyn, Saudi Gitmo Recidivists, LONG WAR J. (June 21, 2010), 
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/06/saudi_gitmo_recidivi.php. 
 151  Russell Goldman, Does Rehab for Terrorists Work?, ABC NEWS (Jan. 1, 2010), 
http://abcnews.go.com/International/guantanamo-release-saudi-rehab-ali-al-shihri-
now/story?id=9458164#.T0reHIeuafg. 
 152  CTC SENTINEL (Jan. 2010 Special Issue), at 2, available at 
http://www.ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/CTCSentinel-YemenSI-
2009.pdf. 
 153  Ministry: 3 Saudi Militants Killed in Blast Abroad, SEATTLE TIMES (Jan. 18, 2010),  
http://seattletimes.com/html/nationworld/2010825549_apmlsaudimilitants.html. 
 154  Biography of Abu Yaqin al-Qassimi (Fahd bin Saleh al-Jutaili), AL-MALAHEM MEDIA 
(June 22, 2011, 8:33 PM), http://aljahad.com/vb/showthread.php?t=8421. 
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senior ideologue and theologian for AQAP.155 
In addition to the Saudi recidivists, other Arab states have seen 
recidivists.  For example, Abdallah Saleh Ali al Ajmi (ISN 220), was a 
Kuwaiti released in November 2005.  After his repatriation, al Ajmi 
married and had a child, but within three years conducted a suicide 
bombing in Mosul, Iraq that resulted in the deaths of numerous 
Iraqis.156 
Two of five Russians listed by the government as either 
confirmed or suspected recidivists, Ravil Shafeyavich Gumarov (ISN 
203) and Timur Ravilch Ishmurat (ISN 674), were alleged to have 
been involved in the bombing of a natural gas pipeline within one 
year of their release.157  Another, Ruslan Anatolivich Odijev (ISN 
211), was reportedly killed while resisting arrest.158 
The reengagement of these individuals and others, and the 
death and damage that resulted, may have been greatly reduced if 
the government had conducted proper risk assessment and made 
release contingent upon such assessment.  Instead, as described 
below, most releases appear to have been based upon diplomatic and 
political expediency. 
B.  Wishful Thinking: False Hope of Continued Detention or 
Prosecution 
The HASC Report,159 while failing to contribute to our 
knowledge of the recidivism rates or provide new information 
regarding former GTMO detainees, does point out the failures and 
the confusion regarding the transfer of detainees out of GTMO.  The 
report outlines the chaotic situation that existed as the U.S. 
government attempted to rid itself of some detainees and relieve the 
diplomatic pressure from abroad, and shows how various department 
 
 155  Thomas Joscelyn, Former Guantanamo Detainee Now al Qaeda in Arabian 
Peninsula’s Mufti, LONG WAR J. (Dec. 3, 2009), http://www.longwarjournal.org/ 
archives/2009/12/former_guantanamo_de_1.php. 
 156  Identification of Ex-Guantánamo Suicide Bomber Unleashes Pentagon Propaganda, 
ANDY WORTHINGTON (May 11, 2008), http://www.andyworthington.co.uk/2008/05 
/11/identification-of-ex-guantanamo-suicide-bomber-unleashes-pentagon-
propaganda/; see app. A.5. 
 157   Peter Finn, Russian Homeland No Haven for Ex-Detainees, Activists Say, WASH. 
POST, Sept. 2, 2006, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/09/02/AR2006090200452.html. 
 158  C.J. Shivers, Former Guantanamo Detainee is Killed in Shoot-Out in Russia, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 27, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/27/world/ 
europe/27iht-27russ.6369738.html. 
 159  See LEAVING GUANTANAMO, supra note 18. 
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and sometimes individuals within those departments were working 
toward different goals in the transfer of detainees out of GTMO. 
While the DoD was focused on minimizing the risk of making 
the “disastrous mistake” of releasing a detainee with “the potential for 
killing Americans . . . or who had significant intelligence value yet to 
be exploited,”160 Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was pushing 
to transfer detainees to other countries for further detention and/or 
prosecution.161 
There was a process agreed upon between the State and Defense 
Departments on how to proceed with detainee transfers.162  Since 
some detainees were released with orders from Secretary Rumsfeld, 
however, each country that received detainees did so under different 
restrictions and terms, and sometimes over the objections of the CIA, 
the Pentagon, and the Department of Justice.163 
After seven detainees were released to Russia, the Defense 
Intelligence Agency placed five on the confirmed reengagement 
list.164  The HASC Report states that “the finalized transfer agreement 
included three principal clauses: the detainees would be prosecuted 
in Russian courts; they would remain incarcerated until the end of 
America’s involvement in Afghanistan; and that American officials 
could have access to them at any time.”165  The officials interviewed by 
the committee reported that Russia was to prioritize prosecution and 
not mere legal detention166—neither happened until after a 2005 
attack on a natural gas pipeline. 
The HASC Report also ties the release of many detainees 
without proper screening to the pressure placed on the U.S. from 
both abroad and domestic sources.  It is also stressed that the U.S. 
released detainees to certain countries in order to improve relations 
with those countries, specifically Russia, Saudi Arabia, and the U.K.167 
The Majority Report stresses pressure from abroad and from 
within the U.S. as the major reason behind the transfer of the 
majority of detainees from GTMO.  The report, however, glosses over 
the fact that Secretary Rumsfeld’s goal of transferring detainees in 
2003 was to shift detainees out of GTMO to be held or tried by other 
 
 160  See id. at 21. 
 161  Id. at 30. 
 162  Id. at 2526. 
 163  Id. at 2640. 
 164  Id. at 35. 
 165  See LEAVING GUANTANAMO, supra note 18, at 44. 
 166  See Id. at 44. 
 167  See Id. at 33. 
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countries, even though knowledgeable officials in his own 
department believed that detention of some detainees in GTMO was 
never warranted.168  While the Secretary of Defense, however, trusted 
the legal systems of the receiving countries enough to transfer 
detainees without proper evaluation, the DoD does not trust the legal 
system of the very same countries enough to exclude detainees they 
have acquitted from its recidivism lists. 
C.  Releases Based on Diplomacy or Security? 
Because GTMO detainee releases prior to 2006 were made on 
the basis of nationality rather than factors more appropriate to the 
estimation of risk, the recidivism rate of this group represents an 
ideal base-line roughly equivalent to randomized releases.  Therefore, 
a change in release determinations based upon legitimate risk 
assessments will likely lower the overall recidivism rate.  Additionally, 
risk assessment processes may be used to reduce the incidence of 
recidivism by providing the law enforcement and intelligence 
communities with information that aids in the handling of released 
detainees. 
A threshold question to consider is what is meant by a recidivism 
rate.  As is evident from the government’s own “[d]efinition of 
‘Terrorist’ or ‘Insurgent’ Activities,” not all reengagement in anti-
American activity stands on equal footing.169  While this definition 
excludes many lesser forms of reengagement from consideration, it 
does not draw a distinction between highly damaging activities, such 
as direct involvement in terrorist attacks on U.S. personnel and 
interests, and less damaging activities, such as recruitment or 
propaganda for groups targeting third-party nations.  For the 
purposes of this analysis, “risk” will be defined in line with the 
 
 168  See Id. at 28. 
 169  See infra app. A.6. 
For the purposes of this assessment, activities such as the following 
indicate involvement in terrorist or insurgent activities: planning 
terrorist operations, conducting a terrorist or insurgent attack against 
Coalition or host-nation forces or civilians, conducting a suicide 
bombing, financing terrorist operations, recruiting others for terrorist 
operations, arranging for movement of individuals involved in terrorist 
operations, etc.  It does not include mere communications with 
individuals or organizations—including other former GTMO 
detainees—on issues not related to terrorist operations, such as 
reminiscing over shared experiences at GTMO, communicating with 
past terrorist associates about non-nefarious activities, writing anti-U.S. 
books or articles, or making anti-U.S. propaganda statements. 
Id. 
DENBEAUX ET AL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/11/2013  7:43 PM 
2013] NATIONAL SECURITY DESERVES BETTER 673 
government’s usage: the likelihood of engagement in a defined set of 
activities.  Risk assessments made along both axes, likelihood and 
magnitude, will naturally be more useful in improving outcomes and 
reducing costs in post-detention management. 
1.  Releases Disregarded Recidivism Risk Until At Least 
2007 
In August 2008, the Center for Policy & Research published its 
Profile of Released Guantánamo Detainees: The Government’s Story Then and 
Now, a report analyzing which GTMO detainees were to be released 
between early 2002 and late 2006.170  That report found that, 
although the U.S. government kept track of several criteria that it 
claimed bear on detainee “dangerousness” in one form or another, 
the actual pattern of releases was based solely upon the nationality of 
the detainee.171 
It is impossible to know the reason for this pattern of releases 
from the data that is publicly available.172  It is possible the 
government believed nationality was the most reasonable measure of 
future dangerousness, despite its collection of other data.  It is more 
reasonable to assume, however, that this pattern was due in large part 
to diplomatic pressure and expediency.  For example, detainees from 
traditional U.S. allies were released on average one year earlier than 
nationals of post-Soviet nations, who were in turn released ten 
months earlier than Arab nationals were.173  This trend reflects the 
general levels of influence that each of these groups wields over the 
U.S., as well as the levels of cooperation in the decade after 9/11. 
As another example, Pakistani and Afghani detainees were 
released much earlier than other nationalities.  In the case of 
Afghanistan, the number of detainees actually released rather than 
sent home for continued incarceration indicates that this was largely 
due to mistaken identity—an effect of the fog of war.174  In the case of 
Pakistan, however, the high rate of continued incarceration175 
 
 170  See generally MARK DENBEAUX ET AL., CTR. FOR POLICY & RESEARCH, PROFILE OF 
RELEASED GUANTÁNAMO DETAINEES: THE GOVERNMENT’S STORY THEN AND NOW (2008) 
[hereinafter THEN AND NOW], available at http://law.shu.edu/publications/ 
guantanamoReports/detainees_then_and_now_final.pdf. 
 171  Id. at 30. 
 172  Data published on wikileaks.org is not included in this analysis, due to the 
Justice Department’s interpretation of a court-issued protective order by which the 
author is bound. 
 173  See THEN AND NOW, supra note 170, at 27. 
 174  Id. at 20. 
 175  Id. at 21. 
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indicates that the early releases were likely one of the many 
bargaining devices used to secure Pakistan’s continued cooperation 
in the War on Terror. 
The cases of Yemeni and Saudi Arabian detainees provide 
further examples.  The early release of Saudi detainees relative to 
other Arabic-speaking nations176 is likely a result of Saudi Arabian oil 
wealth and the country’s key role in the War on Terror.177  Yemen, by 
contrast, is a poor, weak nation beset by its own Islamist radicals (now 
AQAP).  Thus, it is not surprising that Yemeni detainees have been 
the group least likely to be released.178 
It is therefore apparent that diplomatic expedience was the 
primary factor in determining which detainees would be released in 
the period between GTMO’s opening and the publication of the 
release data in late 2006. 
2.  The Government Has at Hand Criteria that More 
Accurately Estimate Risk of Recidivism than Nationality 
There are factors other than nationality known to the 
government that could have more accurately estimated the risk of 
recidivism.  Indeed, significant differences exist between detainees 
that are very likely beneficial to estimating this risk with relatively 
high rates of accuracy, including at a minimum the information 
obtained during the CSRT process. 
With the exception of 201 detainees released prior to the CSRT 
process, data is available for all detainees regarding their suspected 
affiliations with terrorist/insurgent groups, how they are connected 
to that organization, and the number of hostile acts committed 
individually against the United States prior to detention.  This data 
was originally published by the DoD in the Unclassified Summaries of 
the Classified Evidence (“R1”), used to support the detention of each 
detainee during the CSRT process. 
In addition, the Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) at West 
Point published a report in July 2007 that drew even finer distinctions 
between the types of acts alleged on the R1.179  The CTC found that 
 
 176  Id. at 22. 
 177  See, e.g., AHMED RASHID, TALIBAN 129–34 (2010); AHMED RASHID, DESCENT INTO 
CHAOS 111, 161, 186, 233 (2008); SEAN M. MALONEY, ENDURING THE FREEDOM: A 
ROGUE HISTORIAN IN AFGHANISTAN 21 (2005). 
 178  See THEN AND NOW, supra note 170, at 23. 
 179  JOSEPH FELTER & JARRET BRACHMAN, COMBATING TERRORISM CTR., AN 
ASSESSMENT OF 516 COMBATANT STATUS REVIEW TRIBUNAL (CSRT) UNCLASSIFIED 
SUMMARIES 34 (July 25, 2007), available at http://www.pegc.us/archive/Organizations 
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the information on the R1 could be classified into twelve factors in 
three categories (high, medium, and low risk).  Their factors include 
such information as training camp attendance, combat weapons 
training, commitment to violent jihad, small arms training, and 
operationally relevant travel.  While the CTC’s analysis of this 
information is somewhat suspect,180 such fine granulation is useful in 
assessing risk in terms of both likelihood and magnitude. 
It should be emphasized that the above examples make use only 
of the publicly available, unclassified data.  Further detainee risk-
assessment information has reportedly been leaked to the public by 
the anti-secrecy website Wikileaks.  Vast amounts of other data are 
available to those who will be making the determinations regarding 
which detainees are released.181  This information has been collected 
and made available to policymakers since early 2009.182 
3.  Increased Use of Risk Assessment Leads to Lower 
Recidivism Rates 
Increased use of risk assessment in determining which detainees 
will be released can lead to reduced recidivism in a variety of ways.  
First, and most directly, by culling out the detainees who pose the 
greatest risk of recidivism, the overall incidence of recidivism will 
decline.  Under such a scenario, the review process will determine in 
each case if the risk of recidivism is too high to warrant release.  
Therefore, those most likely to reengage in terrorism or insurgency 
against the United States or its allies will not be given the opportunity 
to do so.  This will lead to a lower incidence of such reengagement 
overall. 
This expected decline in recidivism has been born out so far, 
according to the official information released about alleged 
recidivists.183  The latest DNI summary of recidivism among released 
GTMO detainees claims that 15.9% of the 599 released detainees are 
 
/CTC_csrt_rpt_20070725.pdf. 
 180  MARK DENBEAUX ET AL., THE EMPTY BATTLEFIELD AND THE THIRTEENTH 
CRITERION: AN ANALYSIS OF THE DATA AND METHODOLOGY IN THE DEPARTMENT OF 
DEFENSE’S RESPONSE TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUEST FOR JUSTIFICATION OF THE 
GUANTÁNAMO DETENTIONS, available at http://www.pegc.us/archive/Seton_Hall/ 
SH06_reply_to_DoD_20071108.pdf; Mark P. Denbeaux, Testimony before the Senate 
Judiciary Committee on C-SPAN: The Empty Battlefield and the Thirteen Criterion 
(Nov. 8, 2007). 
 181  GUANTANAMO REVIEW TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT ii, 56 (2010), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/ag/guantanamo-review-final-report.pdf. 
 182  Id. 
 183  See app. A.8. 
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“confirmed” to have reengaged in terrorist or insurgent activities, and 
another 12% are suspected of doing so.184  The DNI summary, 
however, makes clear that this rate is largely historical.  Executive 
Order 13492, requiring a “comprehensive interagency review” 
including “full assessment of intelligence and threat information,” 
was promulgated on January 22, 2009.185  Those detainees released 
prior to January 22, 2009 have had a reportedly high recidivism rate 
with 17.3% confirmed and 13.2% suspected, while the recidivism rate 
plummeted by more than three quarters for those released after this 
date to 4.5% confirmed and 3% suspected.186 
Additionally, the Center’s own study of detainee recidivism 
shows that 20% of detainees released prior to 2007 warrant a negative 
assessment compared to only 12.6% of detainees released later.187  
While this measure is crude, and does not take into account the 
expected lag between release and reengagement, it comports with 
the findings of the DNI.188 
Second, and less directly, by particularizing the nature of the risk 
in each individual case, the risk assessment process can be used to 
inform the handling of the detainee in the post-detention period.  
The law enforcement and intelligence community can better allocate 
resources tracking released detainees.  If this information is shared 
with our foreign partners, then rehabilitation and reintegration 
programs can be better targeted to the individual detainee in order 
to further reduce the risk of that detainee rejoining the fight.  Lastly, 
the information produced in the risk assessment process may be used 
to create or improve other means of reducing the individual or group 
 
 184  Id. 
 185  Id. 
 186  Id.  The 2009 summary also notes that the average delay between release and 
recidivism is 2.5 years. This delay may account in part to this low rate, but given that 
more than 2.5 years have passed since January 22, 2009, this effect cannot be the 
whole story.  Even if this rate doubles over time, the more than 2:1 disparity between 
pre- and post-January 22, 2009 recidivism is stark.  See app. A.5. 
 187  This percentage most likely overestimates recidivism among those released 
using risk-based procedures since the interagency review process was only put in 
place by Executive Order 13492 on January 22, 2009, and the Periodic Review Boards 
(which only release detainees who do not pose a “significant threat to the security of 
the United States”) were not put in place until 2011.  Review and Disposition of 
Individuals Detained At the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base and Closure of Detention 
Facilities, Exec. Order No. 13492, 74 Fed. Reg. 16,4897 (Jan. 22, 2009); Periodic 
Review of Individuals Detained at Guantanamo Bay Naval Station Pursuant to the 
Authorization for Use of Military Force, Exec. Order No. 13563, 76 Fed. Reg. 14,3821 
(Jan. 18, 2011). 
 188  A more complete analysis accounting for these problems will be produced at a 
later time. 
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risk of recidivism. 
Third, proper risk assessment procedures that estimate the 
likelihood of engagement in high- and low-damage activities 
independent of one another will allow further granulation of the 
targeting noted above.  In doing so, it will lower the risk of highly 
damaging activities, reducing the risk to U.S. interests in the broader 
sense. 
Recidivism rates of detainees released between 2002 and 2006 
represent a statistical worst-case scenario.  Because risk assessment 
was not applied in any cognizable form, the effect on recidivism rates 
was similar to the release of random detainees.  With no distinction 
drawn between high-risk and low-risk detainees, the recidivism rate 
for this early group will be higher than any subsequent group 
applying a risk assessment. 
Recidivism rates for those released based on some form of risk 
assessment will be reduced by limiting the number of high-risk 
releases, as is clear from the stark disparity in recidivism between 
Bush-era and Obama-era releases.  In addition, the risk assessment 
process can aid in prevention by providing information to law 
enforcement agencies, the intelligence community, and foreign 
partners who are involved in handling former detainees. 
VII.  MISSION CREEP: RECIDIVISM BY ENGAGEMENT IN OTHER 
CONFLICTS 
Under any of the various characterizations of recidivism, from 
“return to the battlefield” to the DNI’s current definition of 
“reengagement,” only those actions that are hostile to U.S. interests 
should concern U.S. policymakers.  This is evident in the DNI 
definition, which restricts reengagement to acts against “coalition or 
host-nation forces or civilians.”189  Other activity is outside the scope 
of the War on Terror.  Unfortunately, this grouping is vague and 
prone to expansion, as explained above.  Additionally, many of the 
alleged recidivists reflect this expansive tendency. 
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Figures 1 and 2 show the percentage of alleged recidivists who 
were transferred or released to various countries, as provided by the 
government and independently discovered by the Center, 
respectively.  All of the detainees in each chart were citizens of the 
countries to which they were sent with one exception: a Yemeni 
citizen listed among the government’s thirty-one was sent to Saudi 
Arabia following his release from GTMO.  Additionally, two Afghanis 
had dual citizenship: one Afghani was also British, and another 
Afghani was Bangladeshi.  Because of the small sample size of the 
government’s list, the combined list of those alleged by the 
government and those found by the Center will be used unless stated 
otherwise (See Figure 3).190 
The majority of alleged recidivists have been sent to either 
Afghanistan (32%) or Saudi Arabia (28%) following their release 
from GTMO.  Detainees sent to Russia, however, are statistically the 
most likely to be recidivists.  Five of the seven detainees (71%) sent to 
Russia appear to have reengaged in hostile acts. 
As is clear in Figure 4, not all countries to which detainees were 
sent contributed equally to the group of alleged recidivists.  
Afghanistan is a clear contributor with over 30% of alleged recidivists 
(See Figure 3).  But this actually overstates its role in recidivism.  In 
fact, with only fifteen alleged recidivists among its 202 returned 
detainees, Afghanistan’s recidivism rate is a mere 7% (See Figure 5).  
Indeed, under the DoD’s understanding of recidivism in which only 
“confirmed” recidivists should be counted, this rate drops to less than 
2% (4 of 202).  This is surprising, given that these individuals are 
returned directly to the state in which the war is being conducted.  
Following this logic, looking at Pakistan and Afghanistan together 
results in a “battlefield” recidivism rate of only 1.88% (5 of 266). 
 
 190  To facilitate comparison this Section will use HASC’s more inclusive 
understanding of recidivism, combining suspected and confirmed recidivism.  See 
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non-coalition member Saudi Arabia.  Only three of the confirmed 
recidivists come from troop-contributing Coalition partners other 
than Afghanistan. Even including suspected recidivists and those 
discovered by the Center, only six alleged recidivists come from 
troop-contributing Coalition partners other than Afghanistan. 
The United States clearly should take care to avoid unnecessary 
burdens to all of its neighbors in the international community.  This 
includes returning to them detainees known to pose a significant risk 
of engaging in hostilities, the distribution of nationalities of those 
alleged to have “returned to the fight” or “reengaged” in hostilities in 
the Global War on Terror.  This, therefore, raises the question: How 
far afield does this war range? 
Many Americans believe that, while the situation in Afghanistan 
and Pakistan warrants inclusion within the United States’ war on al 
Qaeda and the Taliban, situations such as those found in Turkey, 
Russia, and Saudi Arabia are more appropriately handled by those 
states’ own law enforcement agencies.  The U.S. government has not 
yet articulated its reasons for implicitly including such a broad array 
of nations within the ambit of its definition of the Coalition, nor has 
it explained its inclusion of acts of domestic terrorism or criminality 
with no apparent connection to Afghanistan or the United States 
within the definition of “reengagement” in the war.  Such a failure 
leaves policymakers with poorly defined parameters in which to 
determine how to best guide the nation through this quandary. 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
It is unclear what value a government report focusing solely on 
negative behavior of released-detainees has beyond propaganda.  If 
the government wished to engage in an analysis of post-release 
behavior of detainees, in order to determine future policy, it would 
require an examination of both recidivists and non-recidivists.  As this 
is not the path the government has taken, it is clear that the 
identification and reports on recidivisms exist to support the 
decisions of the government both in GTMO and in the War on 
Terror.  Until the government (1) identifies and examines the 
recidivists and their characteristics, and (2) acknowledges that there 
are many detainees who live peaceful, private, non-recidivist lives, the 
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APPENDIX A 
The DoD has released eight public statements of recidivism 
numbers including four lists of allegedly recidivist detainees.  Those 
eight documents are either reproduced or linked to in this Appendix 
as follows: 
 
A.1—July 10, 2006 
 
A.2— July 7, 2007 
 
A.3—May 20, 2008 
 
A.4—June 13, 2008 
 
A.5—April 7, 2009 
 
A.6—December 7, 2010 
 
A.7—September 13, 2011 
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APPENDIX A.2 
The following is an exact reproduction of the Department of 
Defense news release of July 12, 2007, titled “Former Guantánamo 
Detainees Who Have Returned to the Fight.”  This press release was 
accessible as of November 26, 2007 at 
http://defenselink.mil.news/d20070712formergtmo.pdf, but has 
since been removed without comment. 
 
 
Former Guantánamo Detainees who have returned to the fight: 
 
Our reports indicate that at least 30 former GTMO detainees have 
taken part in anti-coalition militant activities after leaving U.S. 
detention. Some have subsequently been killed in combat in 
Afghanistan. 
 
These former detainees successfully lied to U.S. officials, sometimes 
for over three years. Many detainees later identified as having 
returned to fight against the U.S. with terrorists falsely claimed to be 
farmers, truck drivers, cooks, small‐scale merchants, or low‐level 
combatants. 
 
Other common cover stories include going to Afghanistan to buy 
medicines, to teach the Koran, or to find a wife. Many of these stories 
appear so often, and are subsequently proven false that we can only 
conclude they are part of their terrorist training. 
 
Although the U.S. government does not generally track ex‐GTMO 
detainees after repatriation or resettlement, we are aware of dozens 
of cases where they have returned to militant activities, participated 
in anti-U.S. propaganda or other activities through intelligence 
gathering and media reports. (Examples: Mehsud suicide bombing in 
Pakistan; Tipton Three and the Road to Guantánamo; Uighurs in 
Albania) 
 
The following seven former detainees are a few examples of the 30; 
each returned to combat against the U.S. and its allies after being 
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Mohamed Yusif Yaqub AKA Mullah Shazada: 
After his release from GTMO on May 8, 2003, Shazada 
assumed control of Taliban operations in Southern 
Afghanistan. In this role, his activities reportedly included 
the organization and execution of a jailbreak in Kandahar, 
and a nearly successful capture of the border town of Spin 
Boldak. Shazada was killed on May 7, 2004 while fighting 
against U.S. forces. At the time of his release, the U.S. had 
no indication that he was a member of any terrorist 
organization or posed a risk to U.S. or allied interests. 
 
Abdullah Mehsud: 
Mehsud was captured in northern Afghanistan in late 2001 
and held until March of 2004. After his release he went 
back to the fight, becoming a militant leader within the 
Mehsud tribe in southern Waziristan. We have since 
discovered that he had been associated with the Taliban 
since his teen years and has been described as an al Qaida-
linked facilitator. In mid-October 2004, Mehsud directed 
the kidnapping of two Chinese engineers in Pakistan. 
During rescue operations by Pakistani forces, a kidnapper 
shot one of the hostages. Five of the kidnappers were killed. 
Mehsud was not among them. In July 2007, Mehsud carried 
out a suicide bombing as Pakistani Police closed in on his 
position. Over 1,000 people are reported to have attended 
his funeral services. 
 
Maulavi Abdul Ghaffar: 
After being captured in early 2002 and held at GTMO for 
eight months, Ghaffar reportedly became the Taliban’s 
regional commander in Uruzgan and Helmand provinces, 
carrying out attacks on U.S. and Afghan forces. On 
September 25, 2004, while planning an attack against 
Afghan police, Ghaffar and two of his men were killed in a 
raid by Afghan security forces. 
 
Mohammed Ismail: 
Ismail was released from GTMO in 2004. During a press 
interview after his release, he described the Americans 
saying, “they gave me a good time in Cuba. They were very 
nice to me, giving me English lessons.” He concluded his 
interview saying he would have to find work once he 
finished visiting all his relatives. He was recaptured four 
months later in May 2004, participating in an attack on U.S. 
forces near Kandahar. At the time of his recapture, Ismail 
carried a letter confirming his status as a Taliban member 
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in good standing. 
 
Abdul Rahman Noor: 
Noor was released in July of 2003, and has since 
participated in fighting against U.S. forces near Kandahar. 
After his release, Noor was identified as the person in an 
October 7, 2001, video interview with al-Jazeerah TV 
network, wherein he is identified as the “deputy defense 
minister of the Taliban.” In this interview, he described the 
defensive position of the mujahideen and claimed they had 
recently downed an airplane. 
 
Mohammed Nayim Farouq: 
After his release from U.S. custody in July 2003, Farouq 
quickly renewed his association with Taliban and al-Qaida 
members and has since become re-involved in anti-
Coalition militant activity. 
 
Ruslan Odizhev: 
Killed by Russian forces June 2007, shot along with another 
man in Nalchik, the capital of the tiny North Caucasus 
republic of Kabardino‐Balkaria. Odizhev, born in 1973, was 
included in a report earlier this year by the New York‐based 
Human Rights Watch on the alleged abuse in Russia of 
seven former inmates of the Guantánamo Bay prison after 
Washington handed them back to Moscow in 2004. 
 
As the facts surrounding the ex-GTMO detainees indicate, there is an 
implied future risk to U.S. and allied interests with every detainee 
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APPENDIX A.6206 
DNI SUMMARY OF THE REENGAGEMENT OF DETAINEES FORMERLY HELD AT 
GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA 
DECEMBER 7, 2010 
SUMMARY OF THE REENGAGEMENT OF DETAINEES  
FORMERLY HELD AT GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA  
 
The Director of National Intelligence submits this summary consistent 
with direction in the Fiscal Year 2010 Intelligence Authorization Act, P.L. 
111-259, Section 334, which states: 
 
“The Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the 
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Director of the 
Defense Intelligence Agency, shall make publicly available an 
unclassified summary of - 
(1) intelligence relating to recidivism of detainees currently or 
formerly held at the Naval Detention Facility at Guantanamo Bay, 
Cuba, by the Department of Defense; and 
(2) an assessment of the likelihood that such detainees will 
engage in terrorism or communicate with persons in terrorist 
organizations.” 
(1) Intelligence relating to recidivism of detainees currently or 
formerly held at the Naval Detention Facility at Guantanamo 
Bay, Cuba, by the Department of Defense 
 
As of 1 October 2010, 598 detainees have been transferred out of 
Department of Defense (DoD) custody at the U.S. Naval Base, Guantanamo 
Bay, Cuba (GTMO) detention facility.  The Intelligence Community assesses 
that 81 (13.5 percent) are confirmed and 69 (11.5 percent) are suspected of 
reengaging in terrorist or insurgent activities after transfer.  Of the 150 
former GTMO detainees assessed as confirmed or suspected of reengaging 
in terrorist or insurgent activities, the Intelligence Community assesses that 
13 are dead, 54 are in custody, and 83 remain at large. 
 
On 22 January 2009, the President signed Executive Order 13492, calling for 
a comprehensive interagency review of the status of all individuals currently 
detained at Guantanamo Bay.  Every decision to transfer a detainee to a 
 
 206 JAMES R. CLAPPER, DIR. NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, SUMMARY OF THE REENGAGEMENT OF 
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foreign country under this review was made after a full assessment of 
intelligence and threat information.  Since the implementation of Executive 
Order 13492 and under the enhanced interagency review process, 66 of the 
598 detainees noted above have been transferred.  Of those 66 individuals 
transferred since January 2009, 2 are confirmed and 3 are suspected of 
reengaging in terrorist or insurgent activities. 
 
(2a) An assessment of the likelihood that such detainees will engage in 
terrorism 
 
The Intelligence Community assesses that the number of former detainees 
identified as reengaged in terrorist or insurgent activity will increase. A 
February 2010 review of GTMO detainees’ release dates compared to first 
reporting of confirmed or suspected reengagement shows about 2.5 years 
between leaving GTMO and the first identified reengagement reports.  
Based on trends identified during the past 6 years, the Intelligence 
Community further assesses that if additional detainees are transferred from 
GTMO, some of them will reengage in terrorist or insurgent activities. 
 
(2b) An assessment of the likelihood that such detainees will communicate 
with persons in terrorist organizations 
It is not unusual for former GTMO detainees to communicate with persons 
in terrorist organizations.  The reasons for communication span from the 
mundane (reminiscing about shared experiences) to the nefarious 
(planning future terrorist operations).  Correspondingly, the Intelligence 
Community assesses that additional former GTMO detainees will 
communicate with persons in terrorist organizations.  Based on trends 
identified during the past 6 years, the Intelligence Community further 
assesses that if additional detainees are transferred from GTMO, some of 
them will communicate with persons in terrorist organizations. 
 
Definition of “Terrorist” or “Insurgent” Activities 
For the purposes of this assessment, activities such as the following indicate 
involvement in terrorist or insurgent activities: planning terrorist operations, 
conducting a terrorist or insurgent attack against Coalition or host-nation 
forces or civilians, conducting a suicide bombing, financing terrorist 
operations, recruiting others for terrorist operations, arranging for 
movement of individuals involved in terrorist operations, etc.  It does not 
include mere communications with individuals or organizations— including 
other former GTMO detainees—on issues not related to terrorist 
operations, such as reminiscing over shared experiences at GTMO, 
communicating with past terrorist associates about non-nefarious activities, 
writing anti-U.S. books or articles, or making anti-U.S. propaganda 
statements. 
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Reporting Qualifications for “Confirmed” 
A preponderance of information identifying a specific former GTMO 
detainee as directly involved in terrorist or insurgent activities.  For the 
purposes of this definition, engagement in anti-U.S. statements or 
propaganda does not qualify as terrorist or insurgent activity. 
 
Reporting Qualifications for “Suspected” 
Plausible but unverified or single-source reporting indicating a specific 
former GTMO detainee is directly involved in terrorist or insurgent 
activities.  For the purposes of this definition, engagement in anti-U.S. 
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 207 JAMES R. CLAPPER, DIR. NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD, 
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE & HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE 
FOR INTELLIGENCE JOINT HEARING TO MARK THE 10TH ANNIVERSARY OF 9/11 (2011), 
available at http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2011_hr/091311clapper.pdf. 
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APPENDIX B 
GUANTÁNAMO BAY DETAINEES ALLEGEDLY RELEASED 
AND SUBSEQUENTLY RE-CAPTURED OR KILLED 
IN COMBAT AGAINST THE UNITED STATES 
 













“There are, I think, some 161—there 
have been 599 detainees that have 
been repatriated from Guantanamo; 
some 161 of them either confirmed or 
suspected to be recidivists. I should 
point out, many of them have been 
taken off the battlefield through 
kinetic encounters, if you will.  So that 
is a concern.” 
Dec. 
2010 




“As of 1 October 2010, 598 detainees 
have been transferred out of 
Department of Defense (DoD) custody 
at the U.S. Naval Base, Guantanamo 
Bay, Cuba (GTMO) detention facility. 
The Intelligence Community assesses 
that 81 (13.5 percent) are confirmed 
and 69 (11.5 percent) are suspected of 
reengaging in terrorist or insurgent 
activities after transfer. Of the 150 
former GTMO detainees assessed as 
confirmed or suspected of reengaging 
in terrorist or insurgent activities, the 
Intelligence Community assesses that 
13 are dead, 54 are in custody, and 83 










According to the most recent report to 
Congress pursuant to section 319 of 
the Supplemental Appropriations Act 
of 2009, the Intelligence Community 
assesses that 20 percent of detainees 
transferred from Guantanamo are 
confirmed or suspected of recidivist 
activity.  This figure includes 9.6 
percent of detainees who are 
confirmed recidivists and 10.4 percent 
of detainees who the Intelligence 
Community suspects, but is not certain, 
may have engaged in recidivist 
activities.   
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“Based on a comprehensive review of 
available information as of mid-March 
2009, the Defense Intelligence Agency 
reported that 14 percent of the overall 
rate of former Guantanamo detainees 
confirmed or suspected of reengaging 
in terrorist activities.  Of the more than 
530 Guantanamo detainees transferred 
from Department of Defense custody 
at Guantanamo Bay, 27 were 
confirmed and 47 were suspected of 
reengaging in terrorist activity.  
Between December 2008 and March 
2009, nine detainees were added to the 
confirmed list, six of whom were 
previously on the suspected list.”   
Jan. 13, 
2009 
61 Geoff Morrell, 
Pentagon 
spokesman 
“I can disclose with you the fact that we 
have a new—we have updated 
recidivism numbers of people who 
have been at Guantanamo, and these 
are the latest numbers we have as of 
the end of December. And it shows a 
pretty substantial increase in 
recidivism. I think prior to this report, 
I think the rate had been about 7 
percent of those who had been held at 
Guantanamo and released who have 
been confirmed or suspected of 
returning to the fight. At that time we 
suspected that 30—confirmed or 
suspected that 37 former detainees had 
returned to the fight. We now believe 
that that number has increased and 
that the overall known terrorist 
reengagement rate has increased to 11 
percent. The new numbers are, we 
believe, 18 confirmed and 43 suspected 
of returning to the fight. So 61 in all 
former Guantanamo detainees are 
confirmed or suspected of returning to 





“A DIA report dated May 12, 2008 cites 
the figure of 36 ex-GTMO men 
“confirmed or suspected” of having 
returned to terrorism. . . with Kuwaiti 
ex-detainee Abdallah Salih Al-Ajmi’s 
confirmation of suicide bombing in 
Iraq, the figure is 37.  The number of 
former Guantanamo Bay (GTMO) 
detainees confirmed or suspected of 
returning to terrorist activities is about 
7 percent of those transferred from 
U.S. custody. The identified rate of 
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reengagement over three years of 
tracking has remained relatively 






Harry B. Harris 
Jr. (USN), 
Commander, 
Joint Task Force 
Guantanamo 
“Of those detainees transferred or 
released, we believe approximately 30 











“The General number is around—just 
short of 30, I think” 
“It’s a combination of 30 we believe 
have either been captured or killed on 
the battlefield, so some of them have 
actually died on the battlefield.” 
Apr. 17, 
2007 
24 Michael F. 
Scheuer, 
Former Chief, 
Bin Laden Unit, 
C.I.A. 
 
“But the rub comes with the release, 
and that is where we are going to 
eventually have to come down and sit 
down and do some hard talking, as the 
Europeans said, because we have had 
already two dozen of these people 
come back from Guantanamo Bay and 











Dept. of Justice 
“The danger that these detainees 
potentially pose is quite real, as has 
been demonstrated by the fact that to 
date at least 29 detainees released from 
Guantanamo re-engaged in terrorist 
activities, some by rejoining hostilities 
in Afghanistan where they were either 
killed or captured on the battlefield.” 
Mar. 08, 
2007 
12 Senator Lindsey 
Graham (SC) 
“Twelve of the people released have 
gone back to the fight, have gone back 
to trying to kill Americans and 
civilians.” 
Mar. 06, **At Least Sr. Defense “I can tell you that we have confirmed 
 
209 * “Approx.” indicates the specific language used was an approximation; the 
specific number cited was used contextually with qualifying language. See “QUOTE” 
column for actual qualifying language used within the immediate textual area of the 
number cited. 
210 ** “At Least” indicates that the phrase “at least” was used in connection with the 
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2007 12–24 Official 12 individuals have returned to the 
fight, and we have strong evidence that 









“As you may know, there have been 
over a dozen occasions where a 
detainee was released but then 
returned to fight against the United 





Senator Jon Kyl 
(AZ) 
“According to a October 22, 2004 story 
in the Washington Post, at least 10 
detainees released from Guantanamo 
have been recaptured or killed fighting 







George W. Bush 
“Other countries have not provided 
adequate assurances that their 
nationals will not be mistreated or they 
will not return to the battlefield, as 
more than a dozen people released 







“[A]s you know, we have several 
hundred detainees in Guantanamo. A 
number estimated as high as 25 have 
been released and returned to the 
battlefield, so that’s not a desirable 







“At least 10 detainees we have 
documented that were released in 
Guantanamo, after U.S. officials 
concluded that they posed no real 
threat or no significant threat, have 
been recaptured or killed by the U.S. 




15 Senator Jeff 
Sessions (AL) 
“They have released several hundred 
already, and 15 of those have been 
rearrested on the battlefield where 
they are presumably attempting to 
fight the United States of America and 








“About a dozen of them have gone 
back to the fight, unfortunately. So 
there have been mistakes at 
Guantanamo Bay by putting people in 
prison that were not properly 
classified.” 
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Adviser, Sec. of 
St. Condoleezza 
Rice 
“Roughly 10 percent of the hundreds 
of individuals who have been released 
from Guantanamo ‘have returned to 




“A couple” Condoleezza 
Rice, U.S. Sec. 
of St. 
“[B]ecause the day that we are facing 
them again on the battlefield— and, by 
the way, that has happened in a couple 






U.S. Dept. of 
Def. 
“Approximately a dozen of the more 
than 230 detainees who have been 
released or transferred since detainee 
operations started at Guantanamo are 









“Unfortunately, despite assurances 
from those released, the Department 
of Defense reports that at least 15 have 
returned to the fight and been 





U.S. Embassy in 
Tirana - Albania 
“Unfortunately, of those already 
released from Guantanamo Bay, 
approximately fifteen have returned to 
acts of terror and been recaptured.” 
Jan. 10, 
2006 




Twelve detainees who’d been released 
from Guantanamo had returned to the 
battlefield and had been re-captured 







Ass. Sec. of Def. 
for detainee 
affairs 
About a dozen individuals who were 
released previously, he said, returned 











“We believe the number’s 12 right 
now—confirmed 12 either recaptured 








“About a dozen of the 234 that have 
been released since detainee 
operations started in Gitmo we know 




“A few” Scott 
McClellan, 
“I mean, the President talked about 
how these are dangerous individuals; 
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White House 
Press Sec. 
they are at Guantanamo Bay for a 
reason—they were picked up on the 
battlefield. And we’ve returned a 
number of those, some 200-plus, we’ve 
returned a number of those enemy 
combatants to their country of origin. 
Some of—a few of them have actually 
been picked up again fighting us on 








“‘At least five detainees released from 
Guantanamo have returned to the 
(Afghan) battlefield,’ said the defense 
official, who requested anonymity.” 
June 27, 
2005 
12 Senator Jim 
Bunning (KY) 
“I could describe many individuals 
held at Guantanamo and give reasons 
they need to remain in our custody, 
but I only will mention a few more_12, 
to be exact. That is the number of 
those we know who have been released 
from Guantanamo and returned to 









“I think that our belief is that about a 
dozen or so detainees that have been 
released from Guantanamo Bay have 
actually returned to the battlefield, and 
we’ve either recaptured them or 
otherwise dealt with them, namely 
killing them on the battlefield when 




George W. Bush 
The president was quick to point out 
that many of the detainees being held 
“are dangerous people” who pose a 
threat to U.S. security. Some of those 
who have been released have already 
returned to the battlefield to fight U.S. 







“In some cases, about 10 cases, some of 
them have then gone back into the 
battle against our guys. We’ve had two 
or three that I know of specifically by 
name that ended up back on the 
battlefield in Afghanistan where they 






“In fact, about two-hundred of these 
detainees have been released and it’s 
been proven that twelve have already 







He provided new details about what he 
said had been at least 10 released 
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detainees who later turned up on 










“There have been—and Secretary 
Rumsfeld talked about this recently—
at least a dozen or so individuals that 
were released from Guantanamo Bay, 
and they have since been caught and 
picked up on the battlefield seeking to 




“Some” Air Force Gen. 
Richard B. 
Myers 
“We’ve released 248 detainees, some of 
whom have come back to the 
battlefield, some of whom have killed 










“At least a dozen of the 200 already 
released from GITMO have already 
been caught back on the battlefield, 










“And as you are aware, there’s been at 
least 12 of the more than 200 detainees 
that have been previously released or 
transferred from Guantanamo that 








Ass. Sec. of Def. 
for Detainee 
Affairs 
Of the roughly 200 detainees the 
United States has released from its 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, detention 
facility, intelligence claims that at least 
10 returned to terrorist activity, the 
deputy assistant secretary of defense 
for detainee affairs said here Nov. 2. 
Oct. 19, 
2004 
“A couple” Vice President 
Dick Cheney 
“And we have had a couple of instances 
where people that were released, that 
were believed not to be dangerous 
have, in fact, found their way back onto 







reported by the 
Assoc. Press) 
“[A]t least seven former prisoners of 
the United States at Guantanamo Bay, 
Cuba, have returned to terrorism, at 
times with deadly consequences.” 
Mar. 25, 
2004 




“Now, have we made a 
mistake?  Yeah.  I’ve mentioned earlier 
that I do believe we made a mistake in 
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Number of Detainees Alleged to be Recidivists: 
3/16/04 - 9/13/11 
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Number of Detainees Alleged to be Recidivists: 
3/06/07 - 9/13/11 
